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ABSTRACT
The rise of new digital technologies has already proven
disruptive in many social contexts and is expected to become even
more so. This Article discusses three main visions on the interplay
between the law and digital globalization: “digital naturalism,”
“digital universalism,” and “digital nationalism.” Digital naturalism
highlights the self-regulatory aspects of digital technologies. While
often disregarded, digital naturalism is responsible for the
mischaracterization of some of the responses of states to digital
globalization. Digital universalism proposes that digital
globalization be regulated at the international level using
international treaties. Digital nationalism suggests instead that
domestic law is the appropriate means for the regulation of digital
phenomena. These theories reflect a broader tendency in legal
scholarship and beyond to interpret digital globalization as an
offspring of economic globalization. This tendency owes its
existence to conceptual path-dependencies established during the
era of neoliberalism and economic globalization, but it is
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increasingly incapable of allowing us to make sense of digital
globalization and its dynamics. In its place, this Article proposes a
theory of law and digital globalization based on the concept of
“digital sovereignty.” Drawing mostly on examples from the field of
blockchain, this Article highlights the complex ways in which the
law operates in digital globalization. It presents four separate modes
of interaction between the law and the digital world and analyzes
multiple possible uses of international as well as domestic law
beyond the dichotomies developed in the twentieth century.
Moving beyond the framework established from a neoliberal
conceptualization of economic globalization, this Article focuses on
the emerging “Cornwall Consensus” to propose a “law and political
economy” analysis of digital globalization. The Cornwall Consensus
offers a vision of a more just international order which would
address digital globalization directly and be more responsive to
those made vulnerable by it. This Article sees domestic and
international law as each having an irreducible role in addressing
digital globalization and the broader digitalization of society. It
identifies a role for international law that, in a neoliberal political
economy framework, would have been played by domestic law. It
also identifies a role for domestic law that in the same political
economy framework would have been played by international law.
The new political economy of digital globalization is based on the
principles of “devolution” and “plurilateralism.”
Keywords: blockchain; Cornwall Consensus; cryptocurrencies;
digital globalization; digital sovereignty; Washington Consensus;
plurilateralism.
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INTRODUCTION
The rise of new digital technologies is expected to disrupt
society.1 For all anticipated disruptions, the world is turning digital.2
The COVID-19 pandemic is further driving the digitalization of
private business and public sectors all over the world. 3 The first
major effort to address digitalization and digital globalization comes
in the midst of a generalized moment of “reasserting sovereignty”
from economic globalization.4 The leaders of the Group of 7 (G7)
met in June 2021 in Cornwall, United Kingdom, during the peak of
the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic
recession it caused, as well as mounting global social justice and
environmental problems, to come up with proposals on a way
forward for the world. The outcome, which builds on background
work conducted by academics and policymakers, is the Cornwall
Consensus. 5 The goal of the Cornwall Consensus (“Cornwall” or
1
The U.S. National Intelligence Council recently predicted that in the next
coming decades the rise of new technologies—as well as related or unrelated
financial crises—will cause great disruptions in human societies. U.S. NAT’L INTEL.
COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2040: A MORE CONTESTED WORLD 6 (7th ed. 2021); JAMIE
BARTLETT, THE PEOPLE VS TECH: HOW THE INTERNET IS KILLING DEMOCRACY (AND HOW
WE SAVE IT) 1 (2018); G20, G20 MINISTERIAL STATEMENT ON TRADE AND DIGITAL
ECONOMY
1
(2019),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/june/tradoc_157920.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2WRT-UTEP] (“Innovative digital technologies continue to
bring immense economic opportunities. At the same time, they continue to create
challenges.”).
2
The
Impact
of
Digital
Technologies,
U.N.
UN75
(2019),
https://www.un.org/en/un75/impact-digital-technologies
[https://perma.cc/V5GY-VABY].
3
World Econ. F., A Roadmap for Cross-Border Data Flows: Future-Proofing
Readiness and Cooperation in the New Data Economy, at 5 (June 2020),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_A_Roadmap_for_Cross_Border_Data_Fl
ows_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/P33D-R29B].
4 See generally Georgios Dimitropoulos, National Sovereignty and International
Investment Law: Sovereignty Reassertion and Prospects of Reform, 21 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 71, 73 (2020) (discussing moves towards “sovereignty reassertion,” and the
various ways in which States have reacted to economic globalization).
5
G7, THE CORNWALL CONSENSUS BUILD FORWARD BETTER (2021)
https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100200092.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5BQ-PHWW]
[hereinafter: CORNWALL CONSENSUS]; see also Press Release, White House: Briefing
Room, Carbis Bay
G7 Summit Communiqué (June
13, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statementsreleases/2021/06/13/carbis-bay-g7-summit-communique/
[https://perma.cc/49E2-M3PQ] [hereinafter:
Carbis Bay G7 Summit
Communiqué]; G7 PANEL ON ECON. RESILIENCE, KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(2021) https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100200091.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6XP-
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“the Consensus”) is to “restore public trust in a rules-based, free, fair
and open economic system.”6 Free trade should remain one of the
most important pillars of this order. 7 At the same time, the
Consensus aims at “build[ing] back the State.” 8 Calls for a “new
social contract” are also generalized in academia and policymaking.9
These proposals for a new international order aim to replace the
constitution of the neoliberal world order, the Washington
Consensus, 10 which Cornwall mimics in its title. Cornwall shall
become the constitution of a post-financial crisis and post-pandemic
world. The Cornwall Consensus for the first time brings digital
technologies and digital globalization to the center stage of
contemporary international ordering. 11 The consensus recognizes
both their societally significant potential as well as their risks.12 The
9BHF] [hereinafter G7 PANEL ON ECON. RESILIENCE, KEY POL’Y RECOMMENDATIONS].
The G7 is a political forum consisting of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. These are the largest economies of the
International Monetary Fund, as well as the wealthiest liberal democracies.
6
CORNWALL CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 1.
7
Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, supra note 5, ¶¶ 27-36.
8
Mariana Mazzucato, Build Back the State, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/biden-lessons-from-usmoonshot-by-mariana-mazzucato-2021-04 [https://perma.cc/LCS8-7ECU]; see also
Terence Corcoran, Terence Corcoran: The G7 Plan: Build Back the State, FIN. POST (Oct.
29, 2021), https://financialpost.com/opinion/terence-corcoran-the-g7-plan-buildback-the-state [https://perma.cc/3A3W-V2C6]. This slogan also piggybacks on
President Biden’s slogan and framework to “Build Back Better.” See The Build Back
Better Framework: President Biden’s Plan To Rebuild The Middle Class, WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/build-back-better/
[https://perma.cc/KY3S7BB7].
9 See Timothy Meyer & Frank J. Garcia, Restoring Trade’s Social Contract, 116
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 78, 81 (2018); see also G20 RSCH. GRP., G20 MINISTERIAL
STATEMENT
ON
TRADE
AND
INVESTMENT
¶
11
(2021),
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2021/211012trade.html#:~:text=We%20reiterate%20our%20commitment%20to,equitable%20an
d%20more%20inclusive%20growth [https://perma.cc/DL59-BUDU]. The World
Bank together with academics and policymakers from around the world have
recently called for a “new social contract for data.” WBG., World Development Report
2021: Data for Better Lives, at 11 (2021).
10 See generally John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus,
in THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARD A NEW GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 14, 15-17 (Marcus Serra & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008) (discussing the
history of the Washington Consensus).
11
MIT academics have also called for a “New, Digital Bretton Woods” in the
sphere of digital finance. Alex Pentland, Alex Lipton & Thomas Hardjono, Time for
a
New,
Digital
Bretton
Woods,
BARRON’S
(June
18,
2021),
https://www.barrons.com/articles/new-technologies-will-reshape-the-financialecosystem-and-the-world-with-it-51624023107 [https://perma.cc/F7GK-PLUV].
12
Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, supra note 5, ¶ 31.

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2022

46

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

Vol. 44:1

“digital” sphere is elevated to the status of one of the four themes
central to economic resilience—alongside health, trade and
climate.13
Digital technologies have one feature that makes them even
more distinctive than disruptive technologies of the past: they are
by nature and design transnational.14 The “platform” and “sharing
economy” change both economic relationships and social
interactions at the global level.15 Residential Proxy (RESIP) services
are rapidly transforming our notions of privacy in a transnational
context.16 This Article focuses on and draws examples from the field
of blockchain and the “crypto-globalization” this new technology
has spearheaded.17 Blockchains can help transfer any type of data,
information, and value. They can replace paper documents with
digital ones stored in a tamper-proof ledger. Blockchain is thus a
new general-purpose technology that can be used in multiple
13

at 1.

G7 PANEL ON ECON. RESILIENCE, KEY POL’Y RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5,

14
ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: HOW THE WEB BINDS THE
WORLD TOGETHER IN COMMERCE 9 (2013) (comparing the internet to the Silk Road in
its ability to connect the world in trade); RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT
CONVERGENCE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW GLOBALIZATION 298 (2016);
James Manyika, Susan Lund, Jacques Bughin, Jonathan Woetzel, Kalin Stamenov,
& Dhruv Dhingra, Digital Globalization: The New Era of Global Flows, MCKINSEY
DIGITAL
(Feb.
24,
2016),
https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/digital-globalization-the-new-era-ofglobal-flows [https://perma.cc/L69W-MAMZ]; ABISHUR PRAKASH, THE WORLD IS
VERTICAL: HOW TECHNOLOGY IS REMAKING GLOBALIZATION (2021) (offering further
insights on digital globalization). Some genuinely global technologies are the
blockchain, 5G networks, and cloud computing. Cf. Kimberley Rust, Block-chain
Reaction: Why Development of Blockchain Is at the Heart of the Legal Technology of
Tomorrow, 19 LEGAL INFO. MGMT. 58, 59 (2019) (discussing the differences between
artificial intelligence and blockchain).
15 See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 309, 309 (2016); Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating
Innovation in the Sharing Econonmy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 437 (2015); Mark
A. Lemley, The Contradictions of Platform Regulation, 1 J. FREE SPEECH L. 303, 306-08
(2021); TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 297 (2016).
16
RESIPs are intermediaries that use an IP address provided by an Internet
Service Provider, not a data center, and allow access to target services through
household devices. Xianghang Mi, Xuan Feng, Xiaojing Liao, Baojun Liu, XiaoFeng
Wang, Feng Qian, Zhou Li, Sumayah Alrwais, Limin Sun & Ying Liu, Resident Evil:
Understanding Residential IP Proxy as a Dark Service, PROC. INST. ELEC. & ELECS. ENG’RS
SYMP. ON SEC. & PRIV. 1185, 1187-88 (2019).
17
Blockchain technology has been spearheaded by cryptocurrencies; but
blockchain is much more than a technology for cryptocurrencies—or cryptoassets
more generally. See generally Syren Johnstone, Taxonomies of Digital Assets: Recursive
or Progressive?, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 78, 79 (2019) (discussing the
development of taxonomies that map digital assets onto financial markets law).
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contexts to achieve multiple goals. 18 Businesses in almost all
industries are exploring ways to take advantage of the innovative
features of the technology. Governments are also examining ways in
which blockchain may be used for the delivery of government
services. Blockchain facilitates the transmission of data and
economic value independent of the geographic location of the nodes
participating in the blockchain network. Blockchain claims the
development of a new legal order, the lex cryptographia, that is
arguably independent from both the legal order of the states as well
as international law.19
New technologies are often presented as neutral responses to
societal needs.20 The law—as well as society at large—should try to
realize the new opportunities that new technologies make possible.21
But as Professor Langdon Winner famously stated: “technical
systems of various kinds are deeply interwoven in the conditions of

18
Angela Walch, In Code(rs) We Trust, Software Developers as Fiduciaries in
Public Blockchains, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND LEGAL
CHALLENGES 58, 58-59 (Philipp Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios Dimitropoulos &
Stefan Eich eds., 2019); Georgios Dimitropoulos, The Law of Blockchain, 95 WASH. L.
REV. 1117, 1121 (2020). See generally Timothy Bresnahan & Manuel Trajtenberg,
General Purpose Technologies “Engines of Growth?”, 65 J. ECONOMETRICS 83, 85 (1995)
(discussing new purpose technologies).
19 See infra Section I.a; see also Primavera De Filippi, Morshed Mannan &
Wessel Reijers, The Alegality of Blockchain Technology, 41 POL’Y & SOC’Y 358, 359 (2022)
(highlighting the “a-legal”—over the “extra-legal”—nature of blockchain
technology); Michael Anderson Schillig, ‘Lex Cryptographi(c)a,’ ‘Cloud Crypto Lan’
or What? –Blockchain Technology on the Legal Hype Cycle, MOD. L. REV., May 29, 2022,
at 1-9 (discussing the “hype cycle dynamics” of blockchain and the lex
cryptographia).
20
”Technological determinism” and “technological exceptionalism” largely
shape the understanding of the relationship between law and digital technologies.
DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM
1-2 (Merritt Roe Smith & Leo Marx eds., 1994) (presenting the main theories on
technological determinism); Gaia Bernstein, Toward a General Theory of Law and
Technology: Introduction, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 441, 443 (2007) (discussing
technological determinism); Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CAL.
L. REV. 513, 552 (2015) (discussing technological exceptionalism). Technological
exceptionalism suggests that “essential qualities” of technology “drive the legal and
policy conversations that attend them.” Calo, supra, at 549; see also Tim Wu, Is
Internet Exceptionalism Dead?, in THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE
OF THE INTERNET 179, 180 (Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus eds., 2010).
21
”Technology optimists” think that the one and only task for law and
lawyers is to find ways to incentivize the development and uses of technology. See
Gregory Shaffer, Trade Law in a Data-Driven Economy: The Need for Modesty and
Resilience, 20 WORLD TRADE REV. 259, 262 (2021).

Published by Penn Carey Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2022

48

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

Vol. 44:1

modern politics.”22 The same is true for digitalization and the digital
globalization it has prompted.
This Article discusses the response of the law to the emergence
of digital globalization and broader digitalization. The contribution
sits at the juncture of two areas of legal scholarship: the emerging
law and political economy literature,23 on the one side, and law and
digital globalization, 24 on the other. This Article adds a crucial
dimension to the digital globalization discussion as it highlights the
new law and political economy framework this gives rise to, and the
interaction between international and domestic law in the digital
globalization process.25 It discusses digital globalization beyond a
focus on data and it is the first contribution to provide an analysis of
the legal ramifications of the Cornwall Consensus for digital
technologies.
The assumptions of legal scholarship about the roles of
international and domestic law in digital globalization are largely
derived from the perceived understanding of the role of the law in
economic globalization.26 During the second half of the twentieth

Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121, 122 (1980).
Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski & K. Sabeel
Rahman, Building a Law and Political Economy Framework: Beyond the TwentiethCentury Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1810 (2020) (presenting a framework for
identifying and critiquing the way the law has been understood since the twentieth
century, as well as offering a new “law-and-political-economy approach” to legal
scholarship). For a background on political economy’s intersections with and
relationship to international laws governing trade and investment, see generally
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Lisa
L. Martin ed. 2015); JONATHAN BONNITCHA, LAUGE N. SKOVGAARD POULSEN &
MICHAEL WAIBEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT TREATY REGIME
(2017).
24
The legal discussion on digital globalization has mostly focused on the role
of data in the digital economy. See, e.g., Mira Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows
through Trade Agreements, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 407, 407-08 (2017); Shaffer, supra note
21, at 259.
25 See Dimitropoulos, supra note 18, at 1188-91 (discussing a law and political
economy framework of blockchain that is based on the principles of publicness,
trust, and interoperability). The work of Frank Pasquale in this area aims at
developing a new law and political economy framework for new technologies with
a focus on AI and algorithms. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY:
THE SECRET ALGORITHMS BEHIND MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); FRANK PASQUALE,
NEW LAWS OF ROBOTICS: DEFENDING HUMAN EXPERTISE IN THE AGE OF AI (2020).
26
For information on the structuring of digital globalization in the image of
economic globalization, see DAN CIURIAK, CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
INNOVATION, PAPER NO. 162, DIGITAL TRADE: IS DATA TREATY-READY? 4-9 (2018),
www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/Paper%20no.162web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YY8M-JDD9] (discussing how the free cross-border data flow is
22

23

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/3

2022

Law and Digital Globalization

49

century, when the “neoliberal” paradigm of world order became
dominant, 27 international law played the role of the promoter of
economic globalization. It is now often suggested that the law
should play a similar role in digital globalization.28
On the other side, in the “geo-economic” paradigm of the world
order that aims at replacing neoliberalism as the dominant political
and economic system of world order, 29 a “nationalist” variant of
domestic law arguably aims at taking over. 30 Digitalization also
reactivated the regulatory instincts of the state; the turn to the
digital, including the rise of blockchain, FinTech, and cross-border
data flows, is prompting a reaction by the state. The digital space is
arguably the new battleground of sovereignty—this time in the form
of “digital” or “cyber sovereignty.”31
The law’s position in digital globalization is much more nuanced
than this.32 To begin with, the dualism suggested in the above two
approaches disregards certain forms of digital globalization. This
Article identifies instead three visions of the relationship between
law and digital globalization. “Digital naturalism” reflects the
tendencies towards autonomy and self-regulation of contemporary
digital technologies identified above, such as the emergence of lex
cryptographia. “Digital universalism” largely reflects the neoliberal
becoming the “fifth freedom”—alongside the freedom of movement of “goods,
services, capital, and labour”).
27
Anthea Roberts, Henrique Choer Moraes & Victor Ferguson, Toward A
Geoeconomic Order in International Trade and Investment, 22 J. INT’L ECON. L. 655, 65759 (2019).
28 See infra Section I.b.
29
Roberts et al., supra note 27.
30
See infra Section I.c.; see also Anupam Chander & Uyên P. Lê, Data
Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 679-82 (2015)
31
Julia Pohle & Thorsten Thiel, Digital Sovereignty, INTERNET POL’Y REV., Dec.
17, 2020, at 1, 2-4; Milton L. Mueller, Against Sovereignty in Cyberspace, 22 INT’L
STUDS. REV. 779, 779 (2020); Kevin Jon Heller, In Defense of Pure Sovereignty in
Cyberspace, 97 INT’L L. STUDS. 1432, 1436 (2021); Chien-Huei Wu, Sovereignty Fever:
The Territorial Turn of Global Cyber Order, 81 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 651, 652 (2021);
see also Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 313, 352-65
(2015) (discussing theories on cyberspace regulation and their evolution over time);
Harald A. Summa, How GAIA-X is Paving the Way to European Data Sovereignty,
DOTMAGAZINE (Mar. 2020), https://www.dotmagazine.online/issues/cloud-andorientation/build-your-own-internet-gaia-x
[https://perma.cc/2WB8-X9W6]
(describing how the effort to control cross border data flows is best understood as
an exercise of “data sovereignty”).
32 See Roberts et al., supra note 27, at 666-69 (offering an equally nuanced
understanding of the relationship between law and digital globalization and
focusing its analysis on the background conditions leading to the transition from
the “neoliberal” to the “geoeconomic order”).
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attitude that suggests that international law’s mandate is to promote
digital globalization at the international level. “Digital nationalism”
mirrors the view that domestic law plays the role of closing off the
state to protect national policies and values.
Each vision of law and digital globalization comes with its own
set of political and economic principles, as well as understanding on
the role of the law in digital globalization: its own law and political
economy framework. This Article moves beyond these categories to
unravel the various roles the law performs in contemporary digital
globalization. 33 It identifies four distinct modes of interaction
between law and the digital world—two at the level of international
law, and two at the level of domestic law. These modes reflect
different ways in which States perceive their sovereign identity and
exercise their sovereign authority. International law is often used by
states to “reassert” sovereignty at the international level with the
confirmation, for example, of new rights to regulate within
international treaties. On the other side, international law has
developed a more “nationalist” dimension that aims at promoting
national interests outside a state’s borders.
Also, domestic law has a much more nuanced role than what is
assumed by traditional approaches to sovereignty as nationalism.
On one side, states have been reclaiming digital sovereignty and
more “policy space” with a view towards developing new industrial
policies. On the other side, the new varieties of international law
have led to a response by various countries around the world,
including the United States, that are developing or expanding
investment screening mechanisms to protect “critical technologies”
and “critical infrastructure” as potential areas falling under the

33
The four modes presented in this Article are based on the premise that there
are two layers of interaction between the law and digital technologies: the law
within digital technologies, such as lex cryptographia, and the law of the interaction
between the real world and the digital world. I focus on the latter. See Georgios
Dimitropoulos, Blockchain Law: Between Public and Private, Transnational and
Domestic, in THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 169, 169 (Takis Tridimas &
Mateja Durovic eds., 2021); see also Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the
Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO STATE L.J. 1217, 1218-22, 1226-34 (2017) (explaining the
difference between Asimov’s laws of robotics that apply to robots, and the law of
robotics developed in the article that apply to humans—robot-users or robotprogrammers or robot-operators—in their interplay with robots and AI). See
generally THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW AND VIRTUAL WORLDS (Jack M. Balkin & Beth
Simone Noveck eds., 2006) (distinguishing these two layers of interaction between
the law and the virtual world(s) outside the sphere of blockchain).
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scope of national security review.34 Other domestic policies aim at
reasserting sovereignty in ways that “domesticate” naturalist digital
globalization, and making it work in favor of the state.
International law is not exclusively used to promote previously
identified universal values such as the freedom of movement of
goods and services.35 Even more strikingly, the move to domestic
law does not necessarily signify a trend for most states to isolate
themselves from other states and the international economy. It is
rather more often an effort to achieve international goals while
exercising more control over the types and means of digital
globalization. Thus, the adoption of domestic laws and the overall
domestication process do not suggest abandoning the fundamental
values of international law, such as the freedom of movement of
products and capital across borders; they are rather more broadly
akin to a different version of an international political economy
compared to the one dominant during neoliberalism and economic
globalization. Building on political theory going back to Thomas
Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, this Article provides a new narrative
for digital globalization based on an integrated law and political
economy framework that sees an equal role for domestic and
international law in dealing with universal phenomena such as
digital globalization and the broader digitalization of society. 36
Cornwall embodies these transformations.
34 See Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), Pub. L.
No. 115-232, 132 Stat. 2173 (codified as amended in scattered sections of Title 50 of
the United States Code).
35 See infra Section I.b. (discussing the role of international law as a promoter
of “universal” rules and values).
36
Legal scholars have previously developed theories of international law
compliance that transcend borders. The Transnational Legal Process theory
developed by Harold Koh on the basis of process theories in international relations
considers the implementation of existing international legal norms and obligations
that takes place outside the normal framework of implementation of international
legal obligations—namely legislative transposition of international law by domestic
legislatures and execution by domestic executives. See Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-85, 199-205 (1996); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2631-41
(1997); Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law
Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 646-51 (1998). Dani Rodrik and his colleagues also
recently developed a similar approach to the one discussed in the article based on
a political economy that reimagines a “thin” or “realist” order at the global level,
while envisaging generally separate and delimitated orders structured around
major powers such as the U.S. and China. Dani Rodrik & Stephen Walt, How to
Construct a New Global Order 5-21 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP21013, 2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3853936 [https://perma.cc/QK8N-M4G6].
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This Article is structured as follows: Part I discusses three
visions of law and digital globalization; this tripartite typology helps
better understand and explain the multiple ways in which the law
and digital world interact. “Digital naturalism” highlights the
tendencies of new forms of digital globalization—such as that of
“crypto-globalization,” i.e., digital globalization through blockchain
technology—towards autonomy and self-regulation. “Digital
universalism” sees international law as the layer of law that should
be responsible for the regulation of digitalization. “Digital
nationalism” understands domestic law as a layer of law that aims
at promoting nationalist and protectionist policies.
Part II discusses the role of law in digital globalization. Drawing
mostly on examples from the field of blockchain, it explains the
complex ways in which the law operates in digital globalization. It
presents four separate modes of interaction between the law and the
digital world, and highlights the multiples uses for international as
well as domestic law beyond dichotomies developed in the
twentieth century.
It is hard to explain these new functions of the law based on the
dominant narratives of law and political economy that see a single
linear role for law in the regulation of economic globalization. Part
III proposes a new integrated law and political economy framework
that helps better explain these developments beyond static roles of
law at the domestic and international levels. The alternative political
economy I present suggests that there are no specific functions
allocated to the different levels of law—domestic or international. It
thus helps explain the new ways in which both domestic and
international law are being put to use in digital globalization. The
emerging Cornwall Consensus, based on the principles of
“devolution” and “plurilateralism,” confirms this new integrated
law and political economy paradigm.
I. VISIONS OF LAW AND DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION
The rise of new technologies invariably triggers a response by
society and the law. In the broader social sciences, two main theories
capture developments in the relationship between societal and
political systems and new technologies at the macro-level: techno-
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globalism and techno-nationalism. 37 Techno-globalism is a theory
that sees technology as unifying the world—crossing and to some
extent disregarding or even abolishing borders. Nations are seen at
best as vehicles through which techno-globalist forces operate.
Techno-nationalism, on the other hand, assumes that the key level
of analysis for the study of technology is the nation.
The law is a missing variable in social-scientific approaches to
technology. Legal scholarship, on the other side, largely interprets
digital globalization as an offspring of economic globalization. This
Part unearths and discusses three traditions and visions on the
interplay between law and digital globalization: digital naturalism,
digital universalism, and digital nationalism.
a. Digital Naturalism
Digital naturalism is a vision of the interaction between law and
digital globalization that sees digital technologies as actively
shaping society and the law. The law can only influence
digitalization in limited ways; the law that regulates them is rather
a product of autonomous digital technologies themselves that have
the capacity to self-regulate.
i. A Naturalist Law and Political Economy Framework
Techno-globalism sees technology as a medium that turns the
whole world into a “global village.”38 New technologies have the
tendency to globalize the world; they cross and disregard borders.
The state, according to this view, is an outmoded form of social
organization. It is at best a vehicle, perhaps only a temporary one,

37
Shigeru Nakayama, Techno-Nationalism versus Techno-Globalism, 6 E. ASIAN
SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y: AN INT’L J. 9, 11 (2012); David E.H. Edgerton, The Contradictions
of Techno-Nationalism and Techno-Globalism: A Historical Perspective, NEW GLOB.
STUDS., 2007, at 1, 1 (2007); see also Daniele Archibugi & Jonathan Michie,
Technological Globalisation or National Systems of Innovation?, 29 FUTURES 121, 122
(1997). See generally SYLVIA OSTRY & RICHARD R. NELSON, TECHNO-NATIONALISM AND
TECHNO-GLOBALISM: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (1995) (describing how recent
world economic integration has led to a conflict between trends of technonationalism and techno-globalism).
38
Edgerton, supra note 37, at 1.
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through which techno-globalism operates. 39 The state shall
eventually be overcome by such new technologies as the steam ship,
the airplane, or the radio.40 The end of the Cold War arguably sealed
the transition towards techno-globalism.41
The claim of techno-globalism is associated with claims of the
liberation of society; new inventions are invariably celebrated as
freeing a society constrained by the bounds of the state.42 This seems
to assume the individual as the actor driving techno-globalism.43
The internet is the one new technology that has attracted the
greatest attention for its globalizing properties. It has been
suggested that the internet would give rise to new forms of
governance and that territorially-based laws would have no place in
this virtual world.44
New varieties of the digital space once again are claiming their
independence from the state and moving towards self-regulation.
Again facing the risk of being falsified,45 it may be suggested that at
least some disruptive technologies of our time both have genuinely
global origins as well as aim at the elimination of the constraints
imposed by the state. This Section discusses a new type of digital
globalization that captures forms of deep globalization and growing
digital connectivity that happen at the individual level.
A classification of modes of digital and digitally-enabled trade
offered by Dan Ciuriak and Maria Ptashkina helps us understand
the potential qualitative differences between previous and current
forms of digital globalization.46 The authors suggest a classification
of transactions based on delivery mode and the nature of the parties
to the transaction. Mode 1 encompasses “digital to real”
transactions, including provision of access to the internet; Mode 2
Id.
Id. at 10-11.
41
Nakayama, supra note 37, at 11.
42
Winner, supra note 22, at 122.
43 See Nakayama, supra note 37, at 11 (highlighting privatization of science and
technology as the driving factors of techno-globalism).
44
David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996).
45
See George Orwell, As I Please, TRIB. (May 12, 1944),
http://www.telelib.com/authors/O/OrwellGeorge/essay/tribune/AsIPlease194
40512.html [https://perma.cc/9W7D-URMQ] (discussing the falsification of midtwentieth century claims).
46
Dan Ciuriak & Maria Ptashkina, Int’l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., The
Digital Transformation and the Transformation of International Trade, at 25-31 tbl.A1
(Jan. 2018) (breaking down digital trade into five modes).
39
40
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includes “real to real” business-to-household and business-tobusiness transactions with digital intermediation; Mode 3 includes
“real to real” household-to-household transactions with digital
intermediation; Mode 4 encompasses “real to real” household-tobusiness transactions with digital intermediation; Mode 5 includes
the capitalization of data flows. All these modes of cross-border
transaction involve household level participation in cross-border
business transactions. But Modes 3 and 4 especially involve the
direct participation of the household in international trade. The
internet is developing towards becoming a platform for commerce
between buyers and sellers across borders, thus fundamentally
changing the operation of international trade and investment.47 This
type of “digital economy” is changing the way in which business is
conducted domestically and internationally. 48 The “sharing” and
“platform economy” are prime examples, as is “cryptoglobalization” of the blockchain.
Blockchain is based on two background technologies:
distributed ledger technology (DLT) and cryptography. Both
technologies have their origins in the movements of digital citizenry
of the 1980s and 1990s—mainly cryptoanarchism and the
cypherpunks. Cryptoanarchists and cypherpunks envisaged a new
political economy based on digital technology. They asserted that
the use of technology would bring about broad social changes. At
the individual level, DLT and cryptography would safeguard the
privacy of the individual. At the societal and political level, these
technologies allowed a vision of a new society that would be freed

47
Joshua Meltzer, The Internet, Cross-Border Data Flows and International Trade,
ISSUES TECH. INNOVATION (Brookings, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 25, 2013, at 1-3
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/internet-data-andtrade-meltzer.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QNP-85TM].
48 See generally Premila N. Satyanand, Foreign Direct Investment and the Digital
Economy (UN Econ. & Soc. Comm’n for Asia & the Pac., Working Paper No. 2, 2021),
https://repository.unescap.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12870/3730/ESCAP2021-WP-FDI-and-digital-economy.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[https://perma.cc/2ACZ-X3PH] (exploring how countries can strategically
harness Foreign Direct Investment to build and expand their digital economies).
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from the constraints of the state. 49 Contemporary cyberlibertarianism builds on these movements.50
Bitcoin and the cryptocurrency revolution it spearheaded were
developed and embraced by opponents of the global financial
system on the left and right with a view towards bypassing the
mainstream institutions of the financial markets—commercial
banks, as well as government institutions like central banks. 51
Blockchain promises the same beyond the financial world into all
aspects of individual and social life.
Blockchain is designed as a global technology52—a public and
permissionless software. 53 Public and permissionless blockchains
are not managed by any single entity. No approval or authorization
is required to view or access the blockchain network; the network is
accessible by anyone, anywhere in the world. Their software is
completely open source and available for every person to download,
modify, and create their own version. Bitcoin and Ethereum, two of
the most popular blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, are built on

49
The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, authored and originally circulated via email in 1988 by Timothy May, one of the founders of the crypto anarchist
movement, mimics in its opening the Communist Manifesto. See TIMOTHY C. MAY,
THE
CRYPTO
ANARCHIST
MANIFESTO
(1992),
https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/crypto-anarchy.html
[https://perma.cc/F6CG-S72E]. Eric Hughes, the co-founder of the cypherpunk
movement, speaks in his Cypherpunk Manifesto of the need for a new social contract
largely outside the state and using the means of cryptography, with the goal of
protecting privacy. See ERIC HUGHES, A CYPHERPUNK’S MANIFESTO (1993),
https://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html
[https://perma.cc/J6AY-RXPN].
50 See, e.g., JULIAN ASSANGE WITH JACOB APPELBAUM, ANDY MULLER-MAGUHN &
JÉRÉMIE ZIMMERMANN, CYPHERPUNKS: FREEDOM AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET
(2012); see also STEVEN LEVY, CRYPTO: HOW THE CODE REBELS BEAT THE GOVERNMENT
SAVING PRIVACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2002).
51
SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM 2
(2008),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6GDJ-ZAX4];
Primavera De Filippi, Bitcoin: A Regulatory Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream,
INTERNET POL’Y REV., May 23, 2014, at 1, 1; Usman W. Chohan, Cryptoanarchism
and Cryptocurrencies 13 (Nov. 17, 2017) (unpublished paper) (available via SSRN
at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3079241 [https://perma.cc/3NGJ-4T7G]).
52
See Primavera De Filippi & Samer Hassan, Blockchain Technology as a
Regulatory Technology: From Code is Law to Law is Code, FIRST MONDAY (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/download/7113/5657
[https://perma.cc/P8H7-XF6R]; MICHÈLE FINCK, BLOCKCHAIN REGULATION AND
GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE 58 (2018).
53 See Roy Lai & David Lee Kuo Chuen, Blockchain: From Public to Private, in 2
HANDBOOK OF BLOCKCHAIN, DIGITAL FINANCE, AND INCLUSION147 (David Lee Kuo
Cheun & Robert Deng eds., 2017).
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public permissionless blockchains.54 Blockchains are thus inherently
“transnational constructs;”55 they do not require a central server that
has to be physically located in one jurisdiction.56 They make possible
the transmission of data and economic value independent of the
location of the network nodes. Smart contracts that predate
blockchain technology, and can now be coded in blockchains, have
also been designed to accommodate cross border transactions
cutting through the “Gordian knot of jurisdictions.”57
The general-purpose nature of a blockchain ledger makes it a
technological infrastructure that can be used to achieve multiple
goals 58 and the operation of multiple activities from information
storage to trade to finance and overall service provision. Bitcoin may
operate as a “financial market infrastructure” for worldwide
monetary transactions. 59 Blockchain, with its applications such as
smart contracts, is now becoming a “trade infrastructure”
54
The commercial private sector has started making use of this privately
developed but publicly available technology. This gave rise to a more recent type
of blockchain: private permissioned blockchains. See, e.g., Karl Wüst & Arthur
Gervais, Do You Need a Blockchain?, 2018 CRYPTO VALLEY CONF. ON BLOCKCHAIN
TECH.,
2018,
at
45,
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8525392
[https://perma.cc/885K-9TKF] (discussing the differentiations between public and
private, as well as permissionless and permissioned blockchains). These are
controlled and managed by a single entity—or a consortium of companies—that
can impose restrictions on who can access and change the blocks, and use restricted
access protocols to this effect. There are also hybrid public-private blockchains, in
which nodes with private access can see all the information in particular
blockchains, while the others cannot, or the other way around. See id. at 48.
55
FINCK, supra note 52, at 58.
56
De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 52.
57
NICK SZABO, SMART CONTRACTS: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR DIGITAL MARKETS (rev.
ed. 2018), https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/
CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_
2.html [https://perma.cc/8FPQ-GTSH]; see also Nick Szabo, Formalizing and
Securing Relationships on Public Networks, FIRST MONDAY (Sept. 1, 1997),
https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/548/469
[https://perma.cc/FL6E-5ZJS].
58 See Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A
Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 837-38, 855-83
(2015); Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, Decentralized Blockchain
Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia 1, 42 (Mar. 10, 2015) (unpublished
manuscript)
(available
at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2580664
[https://perma.cc/4CK9-RR59]); FINCK, supra note 52, at 66-80; Dimitropoulos,
supra note 18, at 1117; PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & GREG MCMULLEN, BLOCKCHAIN RSCH.
INST., GOVERNANCE OF BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS: GOVERNANCE OF AND BY DISTRIBUTED
INFRASTRUCTURE
6-20
(2018),
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal02046787/document [https://perma.cc/FPA7-XY2J].
59
Walch, supra note 58, at 837-38, 855-83.
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addressing the complexity of global supply chains that involve
many and diverse public and private intermediaries over multiple
jurisdictions, thus supporting international business transactions.60
Overall, blockchain is a software infrastructure on a global scale.61
This law and political economy framework based on the selfregulatory tendencies of the technology stems from a long tradition
of natural law discussed below.
ii. The Vision of Self-Regulation
Dean Roscoe Pound suggested at the beginning of the twentieth
century that legal science proceeds in tendencies or periods. 62 A
comparative period is followed by a philosophical one, where the
“law is felt to be reason.” 63 The philosophical tendency is then
followed by an analytical period which sometimes coexists with a
critical tendency, as well as an effort of reform through legislation.64
A historical tendency coincides, or sometimes precedes or follows,
the philosophical era, still as a reaction to the philosophical.65
The comparative period is the one that dominated legal theory
for centuries and into the modern age. A paradigm shift took place
in seventeenth century political theory that defined modern political
thought. Natural law (lex naturalis) was reconceptualized and was
thought to be grounded on new foundations. Man and reason—not
God or divine provenance—were regarded as the principal source
of natural law.66

60
EMMANUELLE GANNE, CAN BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTIONIZE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE? 41 (2018); DHL TREND RSCH., BLOCKCHAIN IN LOGISTICS 4 (2018),
https://www.logistics.dhl/content/dam/dhl/global/core/documents/pdf/glocore-blockchain-trend-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG7G-UCW4] (discussing
the potential impact of blockchain on the logistics industry).
61 See Alistair Berg, Brendan Markey-Towler & Mikayla Novak, Blockchains:
Less Government, More Market, 35 J. PRIV. ENTER. 1, 10 (2020) (discussing the potential
for blockchains to challenge state hegemony and design institutions that realize
social welfare objectives); Dimitropoulos, supra note 18, at 1171.
62 See Roscoe Pound, The Need for a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607,
609 (1907), reprinted in 10 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 385, 387 (1964).
63 Id. at 388.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 59 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1996).
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International law first emerged as a discipline in the seventeenth
century; it was itself the result of the emerging modern state and
state theory, as well as the tragic encounters of Europeans with nonEuropean peoples.67 International law of the time drew on the long
tradition of natural law as it was shaped in the Middle Ages and the
early modern period. The naturalist jurisprudence of Hugo Grotius
in the seventeenth century provided the foundations of the “law of
nations” (ius gentium). International law faced its own paradigm
shift away from naturalism and towards positivism in the
nineteenth century. 68 In the “positivist turn” of international law,
consent and custom provided the foundations of positive
international law in an “international society” of sovereign states.
One of the layers of the complicated legal order of the Middle
Ages was the body of law that emerged as a result of cross-border
merchant practices, the lex mercatoria. The origins of the merchant
law go back to a pre-modern understanding of ius gentium that
regulates the interaction between individuals and nations, as well as
among nations.69 Lex mercatoria was thought to be part of natural
law. 70 Despite the move away from the law of nature and its ius
gentium with the transition to the state and the positivist
understanding of international law, lex mercatoria survived until this
day. Merchant law claims an autonomy from the order shaped by
states. It is instead a genuinely self-regulated legal order.
Lex mercatoria has a continuous allure up to the present day in
international arbitration.71 Similar forms of self-regulated bodies of
law have been envisaged in more specialized areas of the economy.
Lex maritima is thought to govern worldwide maritime

67
Antony Anghie, The Heart of My Home: Colonialism, Environmental Damage,
and the Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 445, 448-49 (1993). See generally ANTONY
ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)
(surveying the creation and evolution of the international law system).
68 See Martii Koskenniemi, Into Positivism: Georg Friedrich von Martens (1756–
1821) and Modern International Law, 15 CONSTELLATIONS 189, 189-91 (2008).
69
Pound, supra note 62, at 609 (citing RICHARD WOODDESSON, ELEMENTS OF
JURISPRUDENCE lxxix (1792) (treating the law merchant as part of the law of nations)).
70 See generally Edwin D. Dickinson, Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of
the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952) (describing the evolution of the Law of
Nations and mentioning the wide acceptance of the law of merchants); Harold J.
Berman & Colin Kaufman, Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex
Mercatoria), 19 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 221 (1978) (surveying the universality of
international commercial law).
71
Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and Transnational Governance, 13
J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 627, 633 (2006).
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transactions. 72 Construction lawyers speak about the lex
constructionis that governs infrastructure projects around the
world.73
The difference between these bodies of law and other varieties
of the primitive law of nations is the basis of their claim to validity.
This is not derived from God. It is rather presumed to be usage as
formed in the relevant trade—international commerce, maritime
affairs, construction, etc.74 The main feature of these bodies of law is
the claim to self-regulation of their respective fields through the
rules developed by the practices, individuals, and institutions that
form part of the relevant community.
Given the non-material nature of the online world, theories such
as the ones drawn from natural law and ius gentium provided a very
fertile ground for theories supporting the validity of a new order of
the world of the internet. One of the most recent reiterations of such
naturalist bodies of law is lex informatica, the autonomous rules that
govern the internet.75
Professor Lawrence Lessig has famously explained how code
can operate as law. 76 Code is the man-made architecture of
cyberspace; it can regulate individual behavior qua technology by
imposing systemic constraints on individual behavior in that digital
environment. The code engineer is the “rulemaker” in the
72
Albrecht Cordes, Lex Maritima? Local, Regional and Universal Maritime Law
in the Middle Ages, in The ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MARITIME TRADE AROUND
EUROPE 1300–1600, at 69, 69(Wim Blockmans, Mikhail Krom & Justyna WubsMrozewicz eds., 2017).
73
Charles Molineaux, Moving Toward a Construction Lex Mercatoria – A Lex
Constructionis, 14 J. INT’L ARB. 55, 61-66 (1997).
74
One could still posit that this is an early form of the natural law of reason
as it materializes itself in commercial or other transactions.
75
Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy
Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 553-56 (1998) (likening lex informatica
to other naturalist bodies of law such as lex mercatoria).
76 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). There
are four main ways, according to Lessig, through which individual behavior is
constrained and regulated: (“regular”) law, social norms, market forces, and
architecture. These forces shape individuals’ actions in various ways. The law
creates constraints on individuals by putting limits on actions through legislation
and regulation, as well as punishing individuals that violate the rules. Social norms
regulate cultural behaviors through social mechanisms such as peer pressure. The
market incentivizes or disincentivizes certain behaviors through the mechanism of
supply and demand. Architecture imposes a series of limits on the type of actions
that an individual can do. Architecture is a mode of regulation both in the natural
as well as the artificial environment of the digital world. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE
VERSION 2.0, at 123 (2006).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/3

2022

Law and Digital Globalization

61

environment shaped by technology; 77 the designer of the internet
regulates behavior on the internet; the software developer of digital
platforms regulates behavior on digital platforms; the blockchain
software developer regulates the behavior of blockchain nodes and
other blockchain network participants.78
Blockchain now allows for the lines of influence between law
and code to run in both directions. While code takes the form of law,
the law may also be gradually turning into code: “in the last few
years . . . the law is progressively starting to assume the
characteristics of code.”79 Blockchain technology is a prime example
of “code as law.”80
Drawing on the lex informatica, a new body of law within
blockchain has been discovered: the lex cryptographia. 81 Lex
cryptographia is the “law” within blockchain than runs on DLT,
cryptography, and smart contracts. A smart contract is an
“agreement,” the terms of which between the two parties are
directly written into code, facilitating transactions without thirdparty intervention.82 Smart contracts were first introduced in 2015 in
blockchain technology by Ethereum and are increasingly
intertwined with blockchain technology. the Bitcoin blockchain now
also allows the coding of smart contracts. 83 Smart contracts and
blockchain can support and automatically enforce legal contracts; it
is suggested that this lex cryptographia may one day even replace
traditional contracts.84
77 But see Tim Wu, When Code Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 680-86 (2003)
(suggesting that code alone does not shape its regulation; rather elected officials
play a significant role as well).
78
De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 52, at 9.
79 Id. at 7.
80 Id. (emphasis in original).
81
Wright & De Filippi, supra note 58, at 48-58.
82
Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts: Building Blocks for Digital Markets, (1996),
https://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Lite
rature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh.net/smart_contracts_2.html
[https://perma.cc/WH24-S3Y5]. See generally Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell,
Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L.J. 313, 330 (2017) (describing smart contracts as selfexecuting and enforcing); THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SMART CONTRACTS,
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY AND DIGITAL PLATFORMS (Larry A. DiMatteo et al. eds.,
2019) (describing smart contracts and their features).
83
MacKenzie Sigalos, Bitcoin’s Biggest Upgrade in Four Years Just Happened –
Here’s
What
Changes,
CNBC
(Nov.
14,
2021,
12:13
AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/14/bitcoin-taproot-upgrade-what-it-means-forinvestors.html [https://perma.cc/FG4D-FRH9].
84
De Filippi & Hassan, supra note 52, at 8.
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Blockchain, with its multiple uses and functionalities, and the lex
cryptographia of blockchain and its potential for automating
transactions, present a new paradigm for law. This new paradigm
may affect individual rules, the legal system, and most importantly
how lawmakers, regulators, individuals, and society at large think
about the law. By removing the ambiguity inherent in the law, it
may in fact make legal interpretation and enforcement—tasks
traditionally performed by different branches of government—
increasingly redundant.
Dean Pound accused the legal academe of his time that “[w]ith
us, the profession, at least, is still for the most part under the
domination of the methods and phrases of the second tendency,
long after that tendency has spent its force.”85 In the case of the new
lex cryptographia, the legal profession or legal scholarship are less the
ones to blame for the turn to naturalism. In contrast to some “old”
new technologies, blockchain and lex cryptographia have both global
origins and aim at doing away with traditional government
institutions. The main responsibility for lawyers and policymakers
alike lies in the future structuring of the law shaping the lex
cryptographia—the extent to which it will be allowed in the next steps
of its development to follow more recent path-dependencies, or
rather take on new dimensions beyond the paths that have been
endemic to the development of law and new technologies during
neoliberalism and economic globalization.
b. Digital Universalism
The interwar period saw the rise of a more pragmatist social
science-based international law. 86 International law, while
preserving its positivist foundations, became more “economized” to
accommodate an unstoppable economic globalization. 87 Many
recent approaches model the relationship between law and digital
globalization on the relationship between law and economic
globalization.

85
86
87

Pound, supra note 62, at 609.
ANGHIE, supra note 67, at 127-29.
See discussion infra Section I.b.
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i. Universalist Law and Political Economy Framework
The end of World War II marked the establishment of a new
world order that became known as the Liberal International Order
(LIO).88 The new world order, largely spearheaded by the United
States, was based on the principles of political and economic
liberalism. 89 The second half of the twentieth century was also
marked by the globalization of economies. Globalization was seen
as a process of “denationalization,” a gradual merging of markets,
politics and the law, 90 a top-down movement that stresses the
supremacy of economic relationships in the interaction between the
global and local. In this order, domestic politics were perceived as at
best unimportant and irrelevant, or even inhibitive to the
development of the global economy. This political economy for a
globalized world has been identified as “neoliberal”91 and became
dominant worldwide.92
88
See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, A WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY: LIBERAL
INTERNATIONALISM AND THE CRISES OF GLOBAL ORDER 1-2 (2020) (describing the rise
of the Liberal International Order and the challenges it faces); Michael Barnett,
International Progress, International Order, and the Liberal International Order, 14
CHINESE J. INT’L. POL. 1, 13-16 (2021) (delineating the rise of the Western
international order into the Liberal International Order sometime after the Cold
War ended); see also Stanley Hoffmann, The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism, 98
FOREIGN POL’Y 159, 159 (1995) (calling liberal internationalism and communism the
two great postwar ideologies).
89 See Kristen Hopewell, Strategic Narratives in Global Trade Politics: American
Hegemony, Free Trade, and the Hidden Hand of the State, 14 CHINESE J. INT’L. POL. 51,
51-54 (2021) (depicting the United States as a leader in shaping the post-war
economic liberalism).
90
Jost Delbrück, Globalization of Law, Politics and Markets - Implications for
Domestic Law - A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 9, 11 (1993); see
also Alfred C. Aman, Globalization as Denationalization: Pluralism, Democracy Deficits
in the U.S. and the Need to Extend the Province of Administrative Law, in
WELTINNENRECHT: LIBER AMICORUM JOST DELBRU CK 13, 18 (Klaus Dicke, Stephan
Hobe, Karl-Ulrich Meyn, Anne Peters, Eibe Riedel, Hans-Joachim Schutz &
Christian Tietje eds., 2005).
91 See Roberts et al., supra note 27, at 656; see also David Singh Grewal &
Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(2014) (discussing how neoliberalism has advanced over the last decades and
reshaped the most important domains of public and private life, including the law);
ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADE LAW AFTER NEOLIBERALISM: RE-IMAGINING THE GLOBAL
ECONOMIC ORDER viii (2011) (discussing trade law in the era of neoliberalism, and
possibilities for reform taking into account human rights). See generally QUINN
SLOBODIAN, GLOBALISTS: THE END OF EMPIRE AND THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERALISM
(2018) (discussing the global dimensions of neoliberalism).
92
Some countries implemented some of its aspects differently. See discussion
infra Section II.b.ii.
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The law played a central role in the constitution of this political
economy. International law largely operated as the promoter of
economic globalization. Multilateral institutions like the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade
Organization—and regional organizations such as the European
Union—supported the process of economic globalization. A whole
new discipline of international law, international economic law, was
shaped and accommodated the freedom of movement of goods,
services and capital across borders. 93 International law replaced
domestic law as the dominant means for cross-border trade and
investment protection during the same time.
Twentieth century globalization sharpened a distinction—that
has been in the making for two or more centuries—between the
domestic and the international realm,94 as well as between politics
and economics.95 In the aftermath of World War II, international law
started moving away from mere regulation of horizontal coexistence
of states towards collaboration and cooperation.96 It became a “law
of globalization” establishing a vertical relationship between the
international and domestic levels. 97 During the years of

93 Cf. Steve Charnovitz, The Historical Lens in International Economic Law, 22 J.
INT’L. ECON. L. 93, 93-97 (2019) (explaining the importance of the historical lens to
analyze public policy challenges and international institutions). See generally
ANGHIE, supra note 67, at 196-272 (describing the international economic order and
its relationship to domestic sovereignty); David Schneiderman, The Coloniality of
Investment Law 1-9 (May 21, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (available via SSRN
at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392034
[https://perma.cc/WF3Q-K25Q])
(discussing international economic law’s effect on Western supremacy).
94 See MARK MAZOWER, GOVERNING THE WORLD: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA, 1815
TO THE PRESENT xiv (2012) (suggesting that modern institutions—domestic and
international—have been shaped in a relationship of opposition between
“nationalism” and “internationalism”).
95
This is often referred to as the opposition between “dominium” (the world
of states and sovereignty) and “imperium” (the world of property and ownership).
Quinn Slobodian, Human Rights Against Dominium, HUMANITY (Oct. 4, 2019),
http://humanityjournal.org/blog/human-rights-against-dominium/
[https://perma.cc/WZP8-QXYU].
96 See WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 60, 62 (1964).
97
See Jost Delbrück, Von der Staatenordnung Über die Internationale
Institutionelle Kooperation zur “Supraterritoral or Global Governance” [From the State
Order to International Institutional Cooperation to “Supraterritorial or Global
Governance”], in WELTINNENPOLITIK [WORLD DOMESTIC POLITICS] 55, 56 (Ulrich
Bartosch & Jochen Wagner eds., 1998) (Ger.); E YAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 15-17 (2014).
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neoliberalism, international law established itself as a universalist
project.98
International law’s universalism is predominantly economic.
The Washington Consensus established the priority of international
economic considerations over internal ones. This meant that the
state also started promoting the market at the international level
using the means of international law. 99 The same trends further
intensified during the 1990s. 100 International law’s claim to
economic universalism still persists;101 it has been characterized as
“new moral internationalism” and managerialism.102
iii. The Vision of International Regulation
The same universalist tendencies that have shaped
contemporary international law have also characterized
developments in the interface between international law, on the one
side, and science and new technologies, on the other. Hundreds of
associations and congresses were convened in the nineteenth
century to manage different aspects of contemporary world life.103
The purpose of these organizations was to develop standards for
universal harmonization.

98 See ANGHIE, supra note 67, at 32; see also SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING
INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF
UNIVERSALITY 3-4 (2011). Universalism has not remained unchallenged in the
history of the development of international law. See Armin von Bogdandy & Sergio
Dellavalle, Universalism and Particularism: A Dichotomy to Read Theories on
International Order, in SYSTEM, ORDER, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE EARLY HISTORY
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THOUGHT FROM MACHIAVELLI TO HEGEL 482, 483-84 (Stefan
Kadelbach, Thomas Kleinlein & David Roth-Isigkeit eds., 2017). See generally Ralf
Michaels, Beyond Universalism and Particularism in International Law—Insights From
Comparative Law And Private International Law, 99 B.U. L. REV. 18, 18-21 (2019)
(discussing particularistic theories of international law).
99
See Nancy Fraser, Legitimation Crisis? On the Political Contradictions of
Financialized Capitalism, 2 CRITICAL HIST. STUD. 157, 176-77 (2015).
100 See generally JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF
THE WORLD’S MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE (2004) (describing the “roaring nineties” as
the period of the triumph of market economics).
101
GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 20 (2000).
102 See Koskenniemi, supra note 101, at 372.
103 See MAZOWER, supra note 94, at 103.
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Associationalism gave way to wartime functionalism. 104 Both
trends led to an increasing reliance on bureaucrats and experts at the
international level. 105 These developments laid the foundations of
post-WWII
and
modern-day
specialized
international
organizations—public ones such as the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO),
and private ones such as the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO).106
This understanding of international technical expertise gave rise
to a perceived need to universally harmonize domestic laws and
regulations. The harmonization process intensified in the 1990s and
now involves the harmonization of an even greater policy set such
as IP rights, health and sanitary regulations, subsidies, and
investment and investor requirements.107
Along the lines of these developments at the interchange
between law, science, and technology, digitalization is now largely
understood as just another face of economic and scientific
globalization—a reiteration of the traditional economy supported
by digital technology. 108 Data is added as a fourth factor of
104 See id. at 144. Functionalism is “the idea that institutions emerge” and
develop “as a result of the logic of circumstances by demonstrating their practical
utility.” Id.
105
See id. at 145. In the words of Sir Alfred Zimmern discussing
“expertocratic” bureaucracy in the League of Nations: “the discovery that
Committees of Experts function more satisfactorily on an international than on a
national basis.” Alfred Zimmern, Democracy and the Expert, 1 POL. Q. 7, 15 (1930).
106
MAZOWER, supra note 94, at 115 (noting that such institutions “embody the
old . . . idea . . . that policy is best left to technical experts who know no nationality
but that of humanity”).
107
Dani Rodrik, Putting Global Governance in Its Place, 35 WORLD BANK RSCH.
OBSERVER 1, 13 (2020). For case studies, see, for example, Amy Kapczynski,
Harmonization and its Discontents: A Case Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s
Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571 (2009) (providing the example of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights – Annex 1C to
the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization); GEORGIOS
DIMITROPOULOS, ZERTIFIZIERUNG UND AKKREDITIERUNG IM INTERNATIONALEN
VERWALTUNGSVERBUND [CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSOCIATION] (2012) (describing this mode of “harmonization
through standardization” in international law).
108
Michael Gestrin & Julia Staudt, OECD, The Digital Economy, Multinational
Enterprises
and
International
Investment
Policy,
at
18
(2018),
https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/The-digital-economymultinational-enterprises-and-international-investment-policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JGM2-YE7Z];
see
LORRAINE
EDEN,
E15INITIATIVE,
STRENGTHENING THE GLOBAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT SYSTEM FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: MULTINATIONALS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES IN A DIGITAL
WORLD iii (2016), https://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/3

2022

Law and Digital Globalization

67

production next to land, labor and capital.109 Digital foreign direct
investment (FDI) takes its place right next to traditional types of
FDI.110
Arguably the greatest challenge of the day is that international
economic institutions are designed to accommodate a traditional
economy. The WTO and international trade law have been designed
to serve a more “bricks-and-mortar economy,” first in goods, and
then also services. 111 It is unclear whether domestic measures
addressing digital globalization fall under the scope of the WTO

Investment-Eden-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA3H-CXFS]; WTO Secretariat,
World Trade Rep. 2018: The Future of World Trade: How Digital Technologies Are
Transforming
Global
Commerce,
8
(Oct.
3,
2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/world_trade_report18_e.pd
f [https://perma.cc/6ZZB-UAKP]; U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
Digital Economy Report 2021,46-47 U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DER/2021 (Sept. 29,, 2021),
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/der2021_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KE7L-CRTN].
109
See JOSHUA P. MELTZER, A NEW DIGITAL TRADE AGENDA, (2015),
https://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Digital-MeltzerFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UTK-P25L]; Joshua P. Meltzer, Governing Digital
Trade, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. S23, S33 (2019); Ciuriak & Ptashkina, supra note 46, at
1.
110
Digital FDI is foreign investment in areas such as the platform economy,
social media, data-oriented services, and cloud computing. See Bruno Casella &
Lorenzo Formenti, FDI in the Digital Economy: A Shift to Asset-Light International
Footprints, 25 TRANSNAT’L CORPS. 101, 104 (2018); Matthew Stephenson, World Econ.
F., Digital FDI: Policies, Regulations and Measures to Attract FDI in the Digital Economy,
at 8 (Sept. 2020).
111 See G20 RSCH. GRP., G20 MINISTERIAL STATEMENT ON TRADE AND DIGITAL
ECONOMY 10 (2019), http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2019/2019-g20-trade.html
[https://perma.cc/H4YH-66NW] (emphasizing the interface between trade and
the digital economy); Merit E. Janow & Petros Mavroidis, Digital Trade, E-Commerce,
the WTO and Regional Frameworks, 18 WORLD TRADE REV. S1, S1 (2019) (explaining
why there has been no international legal framework so far in response to the rise
of digital trade).
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disciplines.112 Also, almost no bilateral investment treaty (BIT) takes
into account developments in the digital economy.113
The most recent regional trade agreements (RTAs) such as the
United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), the
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific
Partnership (CPTPP), and the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation
Agreement (TCA) have taken up the challenge of addressing
domestic measures pertaining to the digital economy. Almost all
contain chapters on “e-commerce” and “digital trade,” as well as
provisions prohibiting domestic measures such as data localization
and the imposition of source code requirements.114
A new digital universalism is arguably called for to address
digitalization. Digital universalism could either take the form of
reform and adaptation of mainstream institutions to serve the needs
of a digital economy, or lead to the adoption of new international
agreements, institutions, and rules, such as for the substantive
harmonization of levels of protection of privacy rights, similar to the
previous eras of technological regulation.115
112
For example, it is not clear how some digital services are to be classified
under the GATS. See Mira Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows Through Trade
Agreements, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 407, 413–414 (2017).
But even if they do, the introduction of regulatory measures in the digital
economy may be justified by a broader set of reasons, including those under the
General Agreement on Trades in Services (GATS), such as public order, public
morals, national security, consumer protection and privacy protection. Article
XIV(a) of the GATS may find a broader application to the provision of digital
services than its analogue Article XX(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) because article XIV(a) of the GATS specifies its term should not be
construed to prevent measures “necessary to protect public morals or to maintain
public order.” General Agreement on Trades in Services art. XIV(a), Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS]. Article XIV(c)(iii) of the GATS makes explicit
reference to privacy and data protection of individuals as well as protection of
confidentiality. Id. art. XIV(c)(iii). Article XIV(d) allows consumer protection
measures. Id. art. XIV(d). For useful context and further discussion, see Francesca
Casalini & Javier López González, Trade and Cross-Border Data Flows 25-27 (OECD
Trade Policy Papers, No. 220, 2019).
113
Zhang Sheng, Protection of Cross-Border Data Flows Under International
Investment Law, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY 1, 2-3
(Julien Chaisse, Leïla Choukroune & Sufian Jusoh eds. 2021).
114 See infra Section II.b.i.
115 See Meagan Nicholson, Cross-Border Data Flows: Their Importance, and the
Need for a Global Framework, INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV.: ICLR NEWS (Apr. 12, 2018),
https://international-and-comparative-law-review.law.miami.edu/cross-borderdata-flows-importance-global-framework/
[https://perma.cc/WH8R-PHAH];
Andrew D. Mitchell & Neha Mishra, Data at the Docks: Modernizing International
Trade Law for the Digital Economy, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1073, 1074 (2018);
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c. Digital Nationalism
Claims to nationalism also have a long history in narratives on
the emergence of new technologies. Techno-nationalism posits the
unit of analysis for the study of technology at the level of the state.116
Nations are the important units for innovation through their
research and development budgets and cultures of innovation that
help diffuse and use technology.117
The same is true when it comes to the rise of new digital
technologies. Techno-nationalism suggests that for all the claims of
a global digital citizenry and community through global means of
communication, above all, the internet, territorial borders have not
been abolished and the state has not been replaced as the preeminent
form of social organization.118
The term techno-nationalism in its historical usage has had a
generally negative connotation.119 It has been used in the West in
relation to techno-policies adopted in countries in Asia.120 While the
center of attention in the past was Japan, China is now posited in
media, academia, and policy circles as an emerging technonationalist nation.121
Digital nationalism is the contemporary reiteration of technonationalism in the era of “geo-economics” that claims the role of
neoliberalism as the dominant political economy of world order. 122
Given the historical association of techno-nationalism with the

Joshua P. Meltzer, A WTO Reform Agenda: Data Flows and International Regulatory
Cooperation 3 (Glob. Econ. & Dev., Working Paper No. 130, 2019); Mira Burri,
Towards a Treaty on Digital Trade, 55 J. WORLD TRADE 77, 80 (2021); Nivedita Sen,
Understanding the Role of WTO in International Data Flows: Taking the Liberalization or
the Regulatory Autonomy Path?, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 323, 346 (2018). But see Shaffer,
supra note 21, at 272 (stating that “[p]olicy harmonization should not necessarily
result”).
116
For an example of a work employing this analysis, see SHIGERU NAKAYAMA,
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SOCIETY IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1991).
117
Edgerton, supra note 37, at 1.
118
See Meg Letta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The Dilemma of
Technological Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw, J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 249, 262-63 (2018).
119 See Edgerton, supra note 37, at 2.
120 See id.
121 See Nakayama, supra note 37, at 12-13.
122
Roberts et al., supra note 27, at 656-57.
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East,123 China and other Asian countries are accused of engaging in
new forms of “digital protectionism”124 and “digital nationalism.”125
Differences in the preferred policies to address digital
globalization are said to prompt the emergence of competing
systems and worldviews on the regulation of digital technologies.
Such differences in the preferred policies on cross border data flows,
for example, have arguably led to the development of three
competing governance systems, 126 each advanced by the three
contemporary economic superpowers—the United States, the
European Union, and China.127
On one side of the spectrum, the United States is seen as the
promoter of open digital borders. The United States is arguably
spearheading a world of free data flows using the means of
international law. 128 On the other side, China arguably promotes
closed digital borders and limited cross border data flows. Its
government claims control over its cyberspace with a set of domestic
laws—commonly referred to as the “Great Firewall”—such as the
Cybersecurity Law 2017, the Data Security Law 2021, as well as the
National Security Law 2015.129 The E.U. approach allows for digital
liberalization only to the extent that the free data flow and digital
transactions would at the same time respect the right to privacy and
123
Techno-nationalism has also been understood in the developing South as
a means for nations to step up the development ladder. See Edgerton, supra note 37,
at 5. In the twentieth century, there has been a general convergence of technological
capabilities of nations—especially the rich ones. Id. at 9.
124
For works that discuss digital protectionism and offer perspectives on the
background of the topic, see M.F. Ferracane, The Costs of Data Protectionism, in BIG
DATA AND GLOBAL TRADE LAW 63 (Mira Burri ed., 2021); Susan A. Aaronson, What
Are We Talking About When We Talk About Digital Protectionism?, 18 WORLD TRADE
REV. 541 (2019); Svetlana Yakovleva, Privacy Protection(ism): The Latest Wave of Trade
Constraints on Regulatory Autonomy, 74 UNIV. MIA. L. REV. 416 (2020).
125
See Sabina Mihelj & César Jiménez-Martínez, Digital Nationalism:
Understanding the Role of Digital Media in the Rise of “New” Nationalism, 27 NATIONS
& NATIONALISM 331, 338 (2021).
126 See, e.g., Ciuriak & Ptashkina, supra note 46, at 25; Susan A. Aaronson &
Patrick Leblond, Another Digital Divide: The Rise of Data Realms and Its Implications
for the WTO, 21 J. INT’L ECON. L. 245, 247 (2018); Shaffer, supra note 21, at 268; Paul
Kjaer, The End of Trade and Investment Law as We Know It: From Singularity to
Pluralism, in WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED: A PROGRESSIVE
AGENDA FOR AN INCLUSIVE GLOBALIZATION 67, 67-71 (Alvaro Santos, Chantal
Thomas & David Trubek eds., 2019).
127
Shaffer, supra note 21, at 268.
128 See, e.g., The United States of America–Mexico–Canada Agreement , art.
19.18, July 1, 2020, 134 Stat. 11 [hereinafter USMCA].
129 See generally MARGARET E. ROBERTS, CENSORED: DISTRACTION AND DIVERSION
INSIDE CHINA’S GREAT FIREWALL (2018) (discussing the Great Firewall).
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data privacy of E.U. citizens. This is stipulated in the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which reflects the standard of
protection of the European Union within the internal market, as well
as in the external relations between the European Union and third
countries.130
Historically, though, the United States has been a leader in the
adoption of techno-nationalist policies and American technonationalism has been studied by scholars in Asia.131 Given the more
recent rise of new digital technology superpowers such as China and
Russia, 132 countries around the world and across the political
spectrum are adopting domestic measures to close off their borders
for digital trade and investment. In the United States, as well as
other Western countries, the protection of the domestic digital
market is usually presented as an effort to protect national security
interests rather than a form of digital nationalism.133
Governments all over the world are arguably trying to claim
their “digital” or “cyber sovereignty” using the means of domestic
law. 134 The next Part decouples the notions of digital nationalism
and digital sovereignty and stresses the various ways in which
digital sovereignty operates not only in domestic, but also
international, law.
II. THE ROLE OF LAW IN DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION
The role of law in contemporary digital globalization is much
more nuanced than what is suggested by the above-presented
Shaffer, supra note 21, at 269.
James L. Schoff, U.S.-Japan Technology Policy Coordination: Balancing
Technonationalism with a Globalized World 36 (June 29, 2020) (Carnegie
Endowment
for
Int’l
Peace,
Working
Paper),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/29/u.s.-japan-technology-policycoordination-balancing-technonationalism-with-globalized-world-pub-82176
[https://perma.cc/3EGQ-HNZZ]. See generally CHARLES A. KUPCHAN,
ISOLATIONISM: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S EFFORTS TO SHIELD ITSELF FROM THE WORLD
(2020) (discussing isolationism in American diplomatic history).
132 See Matthew S. Erie & Thomas Streinz, The Beijing Effect: China’s ‘Digital Silk
Road’ as Transnational Data Governance, 54 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 40-42 (2021).
133 See Roberts et al., supra note 27, at 665; HELEN NISSENBAUM, Where Computer
Security Meets National Security, 7 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 61, 64-67 (2005) (discussing
the ways in which computer security has been translated into national security and
expanded to more areas).
134 See sources cited supra note 31.
130

131
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visions. This Part develops a new typology on the role of law in
digital globalization using sovereignty as the starting point. This
Part draws a distinction between international law and domestic
law responses to digital globalization and presents four different
modes of interaction between the law of the physical world and
digital globalization: Neither international law nor domestic law
conform to the roles assigned to them during the years of the ascent
of economic globalization and its aftermath; international law is no
longer exclusively used for universalist purposes; equally, domestic
law is not exclusively used for nationalistic purposes, i.e., to close
off the state from developments in the digital world. All aspects of
law in its interaction with digital globalization today are reactions to
the perceived role of sovereignty in any single legal order.
a. Digital Sovereignty Beyond Digital Nationalism
A series of financial, economic, political, as well as more
recently, health crises have questioned the inevitability of economic
globalization since 2008. 135 Global trade has been receding since
2012, and this seems to be an enduring trend.136 Also, global FDI has
continued to decline since at least 2016;137 the decline has accelerated

135 See James Crawford, The Current Political Discourse Concerning International
Law, 81 MOD. L. REV. 1, 1-6, 10-12 (2018) (discussing the instabilities in international
law in the context of withdrawal, or announced withdrawals, from treaties, and
analyzing Brexit, South Africa’s purported withdrawal from the Rome Statute, and
the United States’ announced withdrawal from the Paris Agreement); David Singh
Grewal, Three Theses on the Current Crisis of International Liberalism, 25 IND. J. GLOB.
LEGAL STUD. 595 (2018) (reviewing the origins and repercussions of developments
challenging international liberalism and arguing that the current international legal
order is in a systemic crisis). See generally Alexander Kentikelenis & Erik Voeten,
Legitimacy Challenges to the Liberal World Order: Evidence from United Nations Speeches,
1970–2018, 16 REV. INT’L ORGAN. 721, 724-30 (2020) (researching leaders’ speeches
in the UN General Assembly and showing the explicit criticism towards the liberal
order).
136 See IRC Trade Task Force, Eur. Central Bank, Understanding the Weakness of
the Global Trade: What Is the New Normal?, at 9 (Occasional Paper Series No. 178,
2016),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbop178.en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/92KU-KVJS].
137 See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Global Investment Trends
Monitor (Issue No. 33, Jan. 2020); U.N. Conference on Trade and Development,
World Investment Report 2019 – Special Economic Zones, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2019 (2019).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/3

2022

Law and Digital Globalization

73

since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.138 These trends have
been identified as shifts towards “de-globalization” or
“slowbalization” in the international economy.139
Beyond the economy, the previous trust in international
institutions has lost momentum too. 140 In recent years, there has
been a significant pushback against international economic
integration and its institutions.141 While the delegation of powers to
international agreements and international institutions was rather
uncontrolled during the globalization boom of the end of the
twentieth century, governments all over the world have started
reassessing their stance. A trend towards legal and institutional
138
Douglas Irwin, The Pandemic Adds Momentum to the Deglobalisation Trend,
VOXEU (May 5, 2020), https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/pandemic-addsmomentum-deglobalisation-trend [https://perma.cc/C69M-GK86].
139 See WALDEN BELLO, DEGLOBALIZATION: IDEAS FOR A NEW WORLD ECONOMY
(2002) 107-18 (explaining the “deglobalization” process); Slowbalisation: The Steam
Has
Gone
Out
of
Globalisation,
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
24,
2019),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2019/01/24/the-steam-has-gone-out-ofglobalisation [https://perma.cc/YNL7-4TDC] (discussing the concept of
‘slowbalisation’ t). See generally PETER ZEIHAN, THE END OF THE WORLD IS JUST THE
BEGINNING: MAPPING THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2022) (discussing the
“collapse of globalization”).
140
MAZOWER, supra note 94, at xiii.
141
Francesco Montanaro & Federica Violi, The Remains of the Day: The
International Economic Order in the Era of Disintegration, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 299 (2020)
(discussing various “disintegration phenomena”); see THE BACKLASH AGAINST
INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY (Michael Waibel et al. eds.
2012); Georgios Dimitropoulos, The Conditions for Reform: A Typology of “Backlash”
and Lessons for Reform in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 18 L. & PRAC.
INT’L CTS. 416, 417-19 (2020); see also W. Michael Reisman, The Empire Strikes Back:
The Struggle to Reshape ISDS (Feb. 16, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2943514 [https://perma.cc/NYU8-9Q3M].
On “backlash” against the rules of the international investment regime, see
generally MUTHUCUMARASWAMY SORNARAJAH, RESISTANCE AND CHANGE IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT (2015); DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN,
RESISTING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW (2016). A similar “backlash” is observed in international trade law.
See Kathleen Claussen & David Singh Grewal, Introduction to the Yale Symposium on
Trade Law Under the Trump Administration, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 1-2 (2018),
https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/1581/files/
2019/02/1_Claussen-and-Grewal_YJIL-Symposium_Introduction_12.10.18sucbvj.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7YX-XKRN].
I do not discuss here potential pros and cons of unilateral approaches. See
Harold H. Koh, Trump Change: Unilateralism and the “Disruption Myth” in
International Trade, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 96, 98-103 (2019), https://cpb-usw2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/8/1581/files/2019/02/11_Koh_Y
JIL-Symposium_Epilogue_Trump-Change_02.05.19-2kfkph2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6KVC-CDP3] (discussing how Trump’s policies have damaged
the multilateral trading system).
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deglobalization started emerging too. 142 Numerous governments
over the last several years have begun developing regulatory
frameworks aimed at consolidating domestic control over activities
formerly delegated to international organizations and other forms—
whether formal or informal—of global institutions and processes.
Many countries are thus again developing domestic frameworks for
the management of foreign trade and investment flows.143
The same processes are taking place in the sphere of digital
globalization too. While conceived as a global network, countries
around the world have developed the technological and legal means
to domesticate the internet, which is now subject to territorial
borders and regulation.144 Territorial regulation of the internet and
other new digital technologies is on the rise. 145 Newer forms of
internet controls seek to stop data not only from entering sovereign
space but also from leaving one jurisdiction, and these new
functions are often played by data privacy laws such as the General
Data Protection Regulation.146
Concerns about digital sovereignty were first raised outside the
West, mostly in China and Russia. 147 The dominant position of
142
Georgios Dimitropoulos, International Commercial Courts in the ‘Modern Law
of Nature’: Adjudicatory Unilateralism in Special Economic Zones, 24 J. INT’L ECON. L.
361, 373 (2021); see also José Alvarez, Introductory Remarks, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ANNUAL MEETING 287–89 (100 ed., 2006).
143 See Dimitropoulos, supra note 4; see also Sergio Puig & Gregory Shaffer,
Imperfect Alternatives: Institutional Choice and the Reform of Investment Law, 112 AM. J.
INT’L L. 361 (2018).
144
See Nicholas Tsagourias, The Legal Status of Cyberspace, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 13, 17 (Nicholas Tsagourias &
Russell Buchan eds., 2015); see also Mark H. Greenberg, A Return to Lilliput: The
“LICRA v Yahoo!” Case and the Regulation of Online Content in the World Market,
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1191, 1192-205 (2003). Similarly, many states are using the
internet as a means of control. Mira Burri, Data Flows and Global Trade Law, in BIG
DATA AND GLOBAL TRADE LAW 11 (2021). See generally JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU,
WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006) (explaining
the ways through which the attempts to control the internet by powerful states has
led to a rediscovery of some of the old functions and justifications for territorial
government)
145
STAN. L. SCH. INTERMEDIARY LIAB. & HUM. RTS. POL’Y LAB PRACTICUM, THE
“RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” AND BLOCKING ORDERS UNDER THE AMERICAN
CONVENTION 18 (2017).
146 See Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Person with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movements of Such Data, and Repealing Directive
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 32-33
[hereinafter GDPR].
147 See Rogier Creemers, China’s Conception of Cyber Sovereignty, in GOVERNING
CYBERSPACE: BEHAVIOR, POWER AND DIPLOMACY 107 (Dennis Broeders & Bibi Berg
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Western tech companies arguably leads to new forms of exploitation
in the South and East—engaging in new forms of “digital
colonialism” and “imperialism.” 148 Measures such as data
localization safeguard domestically produced data as the most
important input of the digital economy.149 If they were to give up on
domestically produced data, emerging markets would also be
giving up on a comparative advantage that their private or stateowned companies otherwise enjoy.150 At the same time, emerging
digital giants such as China are now accused of exercising a similar
type of digital colonialism in other parts of the world, such as
Africa.151
New forms of digital globalization challenge the state anew. The
rise of the cryptoworld is an extreme version of the risks and threats
posed both to the state as an institution and its citizens.152 As the use
of blockchains is becoming more common in many spheres of life
and business, and the quantity and value of cryptoassets is
increasing as well,153 the state may be rendered redundant as a trust
eds., 2020); Min Jiang, Authoritarian Informationalism, China’s Approach to Internet
Sovereignty, SAIS REV. INT’L AFFS., Summer–Fall 2010, at 71, 72; J. Zeng, T. Stevens
& Y. Chen., China’s Solution to Global Cyber Governance: Unpacking the Domestic
Discourse of “Internet Sovereignty”, 45 POL. & POL’Y 432, 432-38 (2017) (discussing
Chinese concepts of digital and internet sovereignty); Julien Nocetti, Contest and
Conquest: Russia and Global Internet Governance, 91 INT’L AFFS. 111, 116-19, 120-21
(2015) (discussing Russian concepts of digital and internet sovereignty).
148
See Renata Ávila Pinto, Digital Sovereignty or Digital Colonialism? New
Tensions of Privacy, Security and National Policies, 27 SUR INT’L J. ON HUM. RTS. 15, 1521 (2018), https://sur.conectas.org/en/digital-sovereignty-or-digital-colonialism/
[https://perma.cc/23V7-WW4B]; Michael Kwet, Digital Colonialism: US Empire and
the New Imperialism in the Global South, RACE & CLASS, Apr.–June 2019, at 3, 7-10
(2019); see also NICK COULDRY & ULISES A. MEJIAS, THE COST OF CONNECTION 54-57,
96-97, 146-49 (2019) (comparing the rise of digital governance with colonialism).
149
Shaffer, supra note 21, at 269.
150 See Aaronson & Leblond, supra note 126, at 262-263 (discussing the size of
the digital economy in China).
151
Willem Gravett, Digital Neo-Colonialism: The Chinese Model of Internet
Sovereignty in Africa, 20 AFR. HUM. RTS. L.J. 125, 126-27 (2020).
152
See Riccardo de Caria, Blockchain and Sovereignty, in BLOCKCHAIN AND
PUBLIC LAW: GLOBAL CHALLENGES IN THE ERA OF DECENTRALISATION 41 (Oreste
Pollicino & Giovanni De Gregorio eds., 2021) (discussing the challenges blockchain
posits to sovereignty).
153
Tech companies and commercial banks have more recently reconciled with
the technology and have even started adopting a technology that was developed to
bypass them. See, e.g., Wolfie Zhao, Bank of America Files for 3 New Blockchain Patents,
COINDESK (Aug. 1, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/bank-americafiles-3-new-blockchain-patents [https://perma.cc/AD9Y-24BT] (discussing the
three blockchain-related patents filed by the Bank of America).
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intermediary.154 The crypto-economy, as a novel type of economy,
cannot be easily restrained by mainstream institutions and the
classic sovereign powers of the state.155 The intrusion of blockchain
in the provision of government services challenges the authority of
the state too. 156 Crypto-organizations, such as Bitnation, are even
claiming sovereignty of the cryptoworld, and sovereignty of their
own.157
The dominant understanding on the perceived role of law in
economic globalization has allowed for certain path-dependencies
to creep into the interpretation of the actual roles of law in digital
globalization. Not all domestic measures relating to new digital
technologies are expressions of digital nationalism. Not all
international law aims at liberalization of global digital flows. I aim
to present a more accurate picture of the role of the law (of the
physical world) in digital globalization beyond the traditionally
perceived roles of domestic and international law in the era of
neoliberalism. I identify four modes of interaction between law and
digital globalization. The first two modes are at the level of
international law, and the last two are at the level of domestic law.
The four different modes are responses of states to digital
globalization based on their own perception of their digital
sovereign identity. I use “digital sovereignty” to expresses the

154 See generally Primavera De Filippi, Morshed Mannan & Wessel Reijers,
Blockchain as a Confidence Machine: The Problem of Trust & Challenges of Governance, 62
TECH. SOC., August 2020, at 2-8 (differentiating between trust and confidence and
discussing blockchain as a “confidence machine”).
155
John Flood & Lachlan Robb, Trust, Anarcho-Capitalism, Blockchain and Initial
Coin Offerings 15-18 (Griffith L. Sch., Rsch. Paper No. 17-23, 2017)
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3074263 [https://perma.cc/8CA9-7R5J]. Some believe
that cryptocurrencies may one day replace sovereign currencies. See Adam James,
Will Cryptocurrency Replace National Currencies by 2030?, BITCOINIST (Mar. 2, 2018,
8:00 PM), https://bitcoinist.com/will-cryptocurrency-replace-national-currenciesby-2030/ [https://perma.cc/SPR3-77UW]. El Salvador recently adopted Bitcoin as
legal tender. See infra Section II.c.ii.
156 See generally John Haskell & Nathan Tankus, Virtual Currencies and the State:
Virtual Currency (in the Shadows of the Money Markets), JUST MONEY (Apr. 9, 2020),
https://justmoney.org/j-haskell-n-tankus-virtual-currency-in-the-shadows-ofthe-money-markets/?fbclid=IwAR3LWRGqdirtK24C42b75odomAlBBhqm2ccs19xl1jPzTXhPLj-GkxH1o8
[https://perma.cc/2W7X-ERDT] (focusing on potential uses of cryptos as shadow
money and in shadow banking).
157 See Blockchain & Crypto News, Investing Guides, Market Forecasts & Reviews,
BITNATION, https://tse.bitnation.co/ [https://perma.cc/QFJ7-9SDR].
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power of the state to independently regulate the internet as well as
other forms of the digital world.158
b. Reasserting Digital Sovereignty Through International Law
International law is now sometimes used to protect digital
sovereignty. “International reassertion” of sovereignty from digital
globalization is a rather novel way of putting international law to
use. States often use international law to protect their digital
sovereignty. International law in its interaction with digital
globalization has developed yet another dimension that is also
largely different from the uses of international law during economic
globalization. International law is now used with a view towards
promoting digital nationalism abroad.
i. Isolationist Reassertion of Digital Sovereignty
In recent years, international treaties have been used to
strengthen the role of the state in international law. New model BITs,
new BITs, and regional agreements such as new mega-regional
agreements provide good examples of efforts to reassert the right of
states to regulate by using international law. 159 The aim of these
international instruments is to safeguard an expanded regulatory
space for states by adopting favorable and more deferential
approaches towards sovereignty at the international level.160
This type of sovereignty reassertion takes place in the sphere of
digital globalization too. All new RTAs include chapters on
“electronic commerce” or “digital trade.”161 The right to regulate in
158 Cf. Katharina Pistor, Statehood in the Digital Age, 27 CONSTELLATIONS 3, 8
(2020) (discussing “digital Statehood” and the ways in which data may be replacing
territory).
159 See generally MEGAREGULATION CONTESTED: GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORDERING
AFTER TPP (Benedict Kingsbury, David M. Malone, Paul Mertenskötter, Richard B.
Stewart, Thomas Streinz & Atsushi Sunami eds., 2019) (presenting the TPP as the
first instance of “megaregulation,” i.e., a combination of inter-state economic
ordering and national regulatory governance on a transregional scale).
160 See generally Dimitropoulos, supra note 4 (analyzing the growing tendency
of states to replace their international investment agreements and solidify domestic
regulations).
161
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
ch. 14, Mar. 8, 2018, N.Z.T.S. 2018/10. [hereinafter CPTPP]. Chapter 14 of the CPTPP
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digital trade has an important place in all new preferential trade
agreements (PTAs). Article 198 of the EU-UK Trade and
Cooperation Agreement (TCA) reaffirms this principle:
The Parties reaffirm the right to regulate within their
territories to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the
protection of public health, social services, public education,
safety, the environment including climate change, public
morals, social or consumer protection, privacy and data
protection, or the promotion and protection of cultural
diversity.162
While domestic data localization and source code disclosure
measures are generally prohibited in most recent RTAs, 163 these
prohibitions are qualified in two ways: First, the prohibition is often
introduced after a recognition of a broad regulatory space for the
parties to introduce domestic measures. 164 Second, security
exceptions are reintroduced to justify deviations. 165 These
exceptions reaffirm the right to regulate to achieve legitimate policy
objectives—this time specifically for data flows.
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP),
which has been signed by China, also has provisions on the location
of computing facilities 166 and the cross-border transfer of
information by electronic means.167 Exceptions to the basic rules are
even more assertive in this agreement.168
New types of international agreements are emerging to facilitate
digital trade. The Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA)
signed by Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, for example, aims at
bears the title “electronic commerce.” Id. All newer RTAs use the term “digital
trade” instead.
162
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, EU-U.K., art. 198, Dec. 30, 2020,
U.K.T.S.No.8/2021 [hereinafter TCA].
163
For examples of prohibitions regarding data localization, see USMCA,
supra note 128, arts. 19.12, 19.16; CPTPP, supra note 161, art. 14.13; TCA, supra note
162, arts. 201, 207.
164 See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 161, art. 14.13(1) (describing data localization
requirements).
165
Avi Goldfarb & Daniel Trefler, AI and International Trade, at 26 (Nat’l
Bureau
Econ.
Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
24254,
2018),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24254.pdf [https://perma.cc/77PD-9ASN].
166
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, art. 12.14, Nov. 15, 2020,
60 I.L.M. 354 [hereinafter RCEP].
167 Id. art. 12.15.
168 Id. art. 12.13(1), (3).
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establishing a cross-border digital trade policy that is based on free
data flows, non-discrimination of digital products, and non-forced
location of computing facilities.169 At the same time, it makes sure to
acknowledge an “inherent right to regulate” in cross-border digital
trade; 170 this right does not only cover traditional areas of public
interest protection, but also encompasses further areas including the
promotion of corporate social responsibility, cultural identity and
diversity, environmental protection and conservation, gender
equality, indigenous rights, labor rights, as well as, more broadly,
inclusive trade, sustainable development, and traditional
knowledge.171
New fora have also been established to provide a home for
international law that is more hospitable to concerns for national
sovereignty. In September 2021, the United States and the European
Union announced the establishment of a new EU-U.S. Trade and
Technology Council with the aim of also addressing national
security-related concerns pertaining to digital technologies.172
Similar developments have been taking place in the sphere of
crypto-globalization. 173 The G7 is also now envisaging an
169
Deborah Elms, Unpacking the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement
(DEPA),
ASIAN
TRADE
CENTRE
(Jan.
28,
2020),
http://asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade/unpacking-the-digital-economypartnership-agreement-depa [https://perma.cc/RL5Z-28GF].
170 See Digital Economy Partnership Agreement, Preamble, June 12, 2020, N.Z.
Treaty Code B2020-02, https://www.treaties.mfat.govt.nz/search/details/t/3945
[https://perma.cc/C6Z7-9Y79].
171 Id.
172 See European Commission Press Release Statement/21/4951, EU-US Trade
and Technology Council Inaugural Joint Statement, § 2, annex Ⅰ (Sept. 29, 2021);
Chad P. Bown & Cecilia Malmstrom, What is the US-EU Trade and Technology
Council? Five Things you Need to Know, PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INT’L ECON. (Sept. 24,
2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policywatch/what-us-eu-trade-and-technology-council-five-things-you
[https://perma.cc/DJJ4-FX3N].
173
In the UK-US Free Trade Agreement documents, for example, the UK
government explicitly considers blockchain. See DEP’T INT’L TRADE, UK-US FREE
TRADE
AGREEMENT
7
(2020)
(U.K.),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads
/attachment_data/file/869592/UK_US_FTA_negotiations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AF9D-NZLD]. International and supranational organizations
have also started engaging with regulation of blockchain and blockchain products.
The International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO), for example,
has proposed regulatory interventions in secondary markets for tokens with a view
to protecting investors. See generally Bd. Int’l Org. Sec. Comm’n, Issues, Risks and
Regulatory Considerations Relating to Crypto-Asset Trading Platforms, FR02/2020,
IOSCO
(Feb.
2020),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD649.pdf
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international framework for safe interoperability with crypto
technologies and assets with a view to averting cybersecurity threats
mostly in the areas of “supply chains” and “critical national
infrastructure.”174
Overall, international law is now being put to use not only to
achieve the universalist aspirations of the past, but also as an effort
to protect digital sovereignty from the threats of digital naturalism
and digital nationalism.
ii. Outward Digital Nationalism
State capitalism has emerged with the rise of China and other
countries in Southeast and West Asia as a paradigm in competition
with the liberal paradigm of organization of the economy.175 State
capitalism is an economic system that allows a proactive role for the
state in economic activity either directly or through state-owned
enterprises (SOEs).176 New and digital technologies are turning into
an important aspect of the state capitalist paradigm. The “Made in
China 2025” campaign, for example, aspires to decrease China’s
foreign reliance on new technologies and safeguard the country’s
self-reliance in high-tech sectors such as semiconductors and
artificial intelligence. 177 Moreover, China’s “new infrastructure
campaign” identifies three areas of infrastructure activities that are
[https://perma.cc/82XV-C95B] (describing issues and risks associated with
trading crypto-assets on CTPs, the relevant key considerations, and providing
related toolkits that are useful for each of them).
174
G7 PANEL ECON. RESILIENCE, KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5,
at 5.
175 See Niall Ferguson, We’re All State Capitalists Now, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 9,
2012),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/09/were-all-state-capitalists-now/
[https://perma.cc/U7XH-D2YC]. See generally Ian Bremmer, State Capitalism Comes
of Age: The End of the Free Market, 88 FOREIGN AFFS. 40 (2009) (describing the recent
rise of State Capitalism, as opposed to free-market model); Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J.
Milhaupt, We Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State
Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 697 (2013) (discussing the mechanisms of State
Capitalism in China as determined by the distinctive system of industrial
organization in which China’s largest state-owned enterprises operate).
176
See Mark Feldman, State-Owned Enterprises as Claimants in International
Investment Arbitration, 31 ICSID REV. 24, 26, 32 (2016) (introducing several ideas on
State capitalism as an opposed concept to free market capitalism); Julien Chaisse,
Untangling the Triangle: Issues for State-Controlled Entities in Trade, Investment and
Competition Law, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF MITSUO MATSUSHITA 233, 233-258, 239 (Julien Chaisse & Tsai-yu Lin eds., 2016).
177
Roberts et al., supra note 27, at 666.
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all tech-related—information-based infrastructure, integrated
infrastructure, and innovative infrastructure.178
SOEs have also started operating internationally. Sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs) have increasingly become more popular
vehicles for governments to invest globally. 179 State capitalism is
reshaping the foundations of the international economic order. As
China gains more global power, it is making an effort to reshape
international economic governance. China’s international influence
is exercised with its state-backed outbound investment and
infrastructure building. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is at the
center stage of these efforts.180 A main difference between the BRI
and “traditional” (or Western-driven) approaches to international
law is the focus on infrastructure. The BRI aims at facilitating the
movement of goods, services, capital, and labor on land and sea
from the Pearl River Delta to the four corners of the globe.
The “digital silk road” is an important part of the BRI. 181 Digital
infrastructure, an integral part of the digital silk road, aims at
digitally connecting the BRI. 182 Even some of the physical
178
See Li Keqiang, Premier, State Council, Report on the Work of the
Government, delivered at the Third Session of the 13th National People’s Congress
of the People’s Republic of China (May 22, 2020).
179
SWFs may be defined as State-owned investment funds generated by the
government and often derived from the surplus reserves of a country. See generally
Markus Burgstaller, Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment Law, in
EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 163, 163-86 (Chester
Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (analyzing the SWFs history and whether they may
have recourse against national protectionist measures under international
investment agreements).
180
Julien Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative:
Mapping the World Trade Normative and Strategic Implications, 52 J. WORLD TRADE 163,
167 (2018) (suggesting that China is developing a new approach in international
economic law); Julien Chaisse, Introduction: China’s International Investment Law and
Policy Regime - Identifying the Three Tracks, in CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
STRATEGY: BILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL LAW AND POLICY 1, 1-22 (Julien
Chaisse ed., 2018) (highlighting the rulemaking role of China in the new order of
international economic law); NADÈGE ROLLAND, CHINA’S VISION FOR A NEW WORLD
ORDER (Nat’l Bureau Asian Rsch. ed., 2020) (discussing the role of China in the
global South); see also BRUNO MAÇÃES, BELT AND ROAD: A CHINESE WORLD ORDER 5
(2018) (suggesting that China is putting forward an alternative value system than
that of the Western world). But see Gregory Shaffer & Henry Gao, A New Chinese
Economic Order?, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 607, 609 (2020) (arguing that China’s model
repurposes Western law and institutions); Prasenjit Duara, The Chinese World Order
in Historical Perspective: The Imperialism of Nation-States or Soft Power, CHINA &
WORLD, Dec. 2019, at 1, 16-17.
181 See Erie & Streinz, supra note 132, at 4.
182 Id.
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components of the digital silk road largely have digital dimensions
as they include fiber-optic cables, antennas, and data centers.183
China has traditionally had a non-intervention diplomatic policy
in foreign affairs. Its vision of international law is one that allegedly
respects sovereignty more than the Western-driven international
law of the LIO. 184 While it generally operates within this
framework 185 —and has been one of the countries that has taken
most advantage of economic globalization—the country’s dominant
economic position allows the Chinese government to shape regional
and international rules and institutions. China is also now
transposing its rules, norms, practices, and governance values to
emerging and developing economies through such means as the BRI
and the digital silk road.186
While some would dispute that law, let alone international law,
has a role to play in these initiatives, China has developed its own
version of global governance structures and international law. 187
New Chinese-led international law shows a preference for “informal

Id. at 6.
See Anastas Vangeli, China’s Engagement with the Sixteen Countries of Central,
East and Southeast Europe under the Belt and Road Initiative, 25 CHINA & WORLD ECON.
101, 103 (2017) (explaining that implementation of BRI would foster China’s vision
on the respect of national sovereignty).
185 See generally PETROS MAVROIDIS & ANDRÉ SAPIR, CHINA AND THE WTO: WHY
MULTILATERALISM STILL MATTERS (2021) (examining China’s overall participation in
the WTO, as well as how the WTO could be reformed to ease tensions).
186 See generally Matthew S. Erie, Chinese Law and Development, 62 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 51, 56-60 (2021) (analyzing how “Chinese law and development” creates order
through transnational law, building on existing legal infrastructures that are
supplemented by extralegal and nonlegal norms).
187
Moritiz Rudolf, Xi Jinping Thought on the Rule of Law, GERMAN INST. INT’L &
SECURITY AFFS. (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2021C28/
[https://perma.cc/Z9XU-8ZCS?view-mode=client-side] (discussing President Xi
Jinping’s approach to the rule of law abroad); Erie, supra note 186, at 55-60
(discussing the Chinese approach to law and development, and the role of
extralegal and nonlegal norms alongside instruments of international economic and
commercial law); Ping Xiong & Roman Tomasic, Soft Law, State-Owned Enterprises
and Dispute Resolution on PRC’s Belt and Road – Towards an Emerging Legal Order?, 49
H.K. L.J. 1025 1028-31(2019) (discussing the use of “soft law” rules in the
governance of Chinese SOEs, and in the resolution of commercial disputes that
SOEs will encounter in their investment in infrastructure projects along the BRI);
GREGORY SHAFFER, EMERGING POWERS AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE PAST
AND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 222-68 (2021) (describing the new
model of economic governance developed by China, which combines private and
public international law in transnational legal ordering imbued with Chinese
characteristics).
183
184
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bilateralism.”188 Economic and other collaboration in the BRI takes
place based on Memoranda of Understanding and other soft law.189
The BRI is also institutionally supported by the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank.190
These developments are representative of a broad vision of
international law. The vision is different than the one shaped during
the years of the dominance of economic globalization. These efforts
give rise to a new form of international law. 191 While focused
outward, it is largely spearheaded by domestic interests and
institutions. International law is used to pursue national digital
policies and a new form of outward digital nationalism.
Having said this, the same may be said about some of the
international agreements that are promoted by the United States
and, to some extent, the European Union. Since most digital
technology companies are based in the United States, the proliberalization (universalist) position of the United States may be
understood as mercantilist and nationalist, too. 192 This explains
some nuances in the regulation of domestic measures in the
USMCA, including the absence of an exceptions clause in the
prohibition of data localization requirements.193
188
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Settlement of Trade and Investment
Disputes Over Chinese ‘Silk Road Projects’ Inside the European Union 5 (Eur. Univ. Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2020/02, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3584173
[https://perma.cc/JRJ5-8MLS].
189
Shaffer & Gao, supra note 180, at 607. See generally Jeremy Garlick & Radka
Hovlova, China’s Belt and Road Economic Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf: Strategic
Hedging Amidst Saudi-Iranian Regional Rivalry, 49 J. CURRENT CHINESE AFFS. 82 (2020)
(discussing the Chinese approach in the collaboration between China and the Gulf
countries).
190
MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44754, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT BANK 2, 6 (2017). In addition, state capitalism, and especially its Chinese
variant, is also propelling the establishment of new “internationalized” domestic
institutions, such as Special Economic Zones, and International Commercial Courts.
See Dimitropoulos, supra note 4, at 89-92.
191
National security is one of the most important considerations for the roll
out of the Digital Silk Road. See generally Richard Ghiasy, China’s Belt and Road
Initiative: Security Implications and Ways Forward for the European Union, STOCKHOLM
INT’L
PEACE
RSCH.
INST.
(Sept.
2018),
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/201811/bri_digital_policy_brief_and_key_findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE6Q-2T44]
(describing the security implications of the BRI in general and the EU response to
such security issues).
192
Shaffer, supra note 21, at 268; see also Dani Rodrik, What Do Trade Agreements
Really Do?, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 73, 75-76 (2018) (suggesting that international trade
agreements serve the interests of multinationals corporations).
193 See USMCA, supra note 128, art. 19.12.
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c. Reasserting Digital Sovereignty Through Domestic Law
Domestic law too does not operate in the linear way it has been
perceived to function during neoliberalism. Sovereignty takes on
multiple dimensions in the form of what is identified here as
“isolationist” and “domesticating” reassertion of sovereignty.
Isolationist sovereignty reassertion—the traditional way in which
sovereignty is perceived to function—addresses two separate
threats to domestic legal orders: naturalist on the one side, and
nationalist threats on the other. Finally, domesticating sovereignty
reassertion policies use domestic law to tame digital naturalism,
making it work for the purposes of the state.
i. Isolationist Reassertion of Digital Sovereignty
Until the end of World War II, international law was less
relevant for the regulation of cross-border economic transactions.
Foreign trade operated mainly with the unilateral opening of
national borders.194 International law was also less relevant for the
regulation of foreign investment until relatively recently. This
changed with the adoption of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade in 1947, as well as the proliferation of BITs and other
international investment agreements (IIAs) in the 1960s.
Many countries around the world have started developing
robust legal frameworks for the regulation of digital globalization
and its various faces and appearances. Some of these responses may
qualify as an isolationist reassertion of sovereignty. This mode of
interaction between law and the digital world corresponds to the
traditional peremptory powers of government. One may
differentiate though between two different types of domestic
responses: domestic measures aimed at addressing digital
globalization in its naturalist variant, and domestic measures aimed
at addressing outward digital nationalism.

194 See, e.g., Brink Lindsey, Free Trade from the Bottom Up, 19 CATO J. 359, 362-63
(2000) (pointing out that a “bottom-up” vision of international law, based on
unilateral decisions to open borders, is more consistent with economic and political
reality than a “top-down” approach, based on international institutions and
agreements).
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1. Addressing Digital Naturalism
A typical trade restrictive measure until recently would have
been a raise in tariff or a tax or a domestic ban or other restriction
imposed on a product or service. Countries now may make market
access conditional on new types of requirements relating to the
digital world, such as restricting the flow of data across borders via
the internet.195 A number of countries have, for example, put in place
data localization requirements.196 These are measures impose local
data storage, i.e., the use of local data centers, or may take the form
of other restrictions or outright bans on the transfer of data abroad.
Mandatory transfer of technology requirements, moreover, may
mandate companies to reveal elements of a technology, such as the
source code of software.197
Many examples of domestic digital measures can also be drawn
from the response of regulators to crypto-globalization. Some
countries have realized the potentially disruptive nature of
cryptocurrencies and have pursued command and control as well as
various other intermediate regulatory interventions with a view
towards protecting domestic public interests from the threat of
crypto-globalization.

195 See Chander & Lê, supra note 30, at 721-26; see also NIGEL CORY, INFO. TECH.
& INNOVATION FOUND., CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS: WHERE ARE THE BARRIERS, AND
WHAT DO THEY COST?, (2017) (noting that barriers to transfer data overseas bear
significant costs, reducing economic growth and social value); Martina F. Ferracane,
Restrictions on Cross-Border Data Flows: A Taxonomy 3-5, (Eur. Ctr. Int. Pol. Econ.,
Working Paper No. 2017-01, 2017), https://ecipe.org/publications/restrictions-tocross-border-data-flows-a-taxonomy/
[https://perma.cc/KJC7-XE2J]
(distinguishing among multiple type of restrictions on cross-border data flows).
196 See Dan Svantesson, Data Localisation Trends and Challenges: Considerations
for the Review of the Privacy Guidelines, 8 (OECD, Digital Econ. Paper No. 2020-301,
Dec.
2020),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/datalocalisation-trends-and-challenges_7fbaed62-en [https://perma.cc/4C9A-GB5M];
see also H. Akın Ünver & Grace Kim, Cross-Border Data Transfers and Data
Localization, (Ctr. Econ. Foreign Pol. Studs., Cyber Policy Paper Series No. 2016-3,
June
2016),
https://edam.org.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/data_transfers_en.pdf; Marion A Creach, Assessing the
Legality of Data-Localization Requirements: Before the Tribunals or at the Negotiating
Table?, COLUM. FDI PERSPS., June 17, 2019, https://doi.org/10.7916/d8-p3q6-tn21
[https://perma.cc/PRQ9-8CY3] (suggesting that data-localization requirements
may be challenged under GATS and IIAs).
197
Andrea Andrenelli, Julien Gourdon & Evdokia Moïsé, International
Technology Transfer Policies, at 8, 13 (OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 2019-222, 2022),
https://doi.org/10.1787/18166873 [https://perma.cc/R4ME-K9SG].
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China has been the main example of a jurisdiction attempting a
major ban on the use of cryptocurrencies. In 2013, the People’s Bank
of China (PBOC), jointly with other government agencies, issued the
“Notice on Precautions Against the Risks of Bitcoins;” the notice
mandated banks and other financial and payment institutions to
discontinue using and trading in Bitcoin. 198 This was not a direct
prohibition of Bitcoin in China, as Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies could still be used privately. Moreover, in 2017, a
committee led again by the PBOC imposed a ban on initial coin
offerings. 199 China finally banned the use of cryptoassets in its
territory in September 2021. 200 In India, similar regulatory efforts
were eventually struck down by the Supreme Court.201 Even in the
United Kingdom, which has adopted one of the most liberal
approaches to crypto-globalization, the Financial Conduct
Authority banned the sale of crypto-derivatives to retail
consumers.202
Other countries have adopted softer approaches to the
regulation of cryptocurrencies. There are three main intermediate
responses—most pioneered by U.S. agencies. First, domestic
regulators, including the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), have issued warnings on the use of cryptoassets by
consumers. 203 Second, cryptocurrencies have been subjected to
198
Gerry Mullany, China Restricts Banks’ Use of Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/06/business/international/chinabars-banks-from-using-bitcoin.html [https://perma.cc/MQ39-JTTW].
199
Kenneth Rapoza, China’s “Bitcoin Ban” No Match for Stateless Cryptocurrency
Market,
FORBES
(Oct.
18,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/10/18/chinas-blockchainbitcoin-ban-no-match-for-stateless-cryptocurrency-market/#2032415e2de6
[https://perma.cc/F5H5-8QG5].
200
PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, NOTICE ON FURTHER PREVENTING AND RESOLVING
THE RISKS OF VIRTUAL CURRENCY TRADING AND SPECULATION
(2021),
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688253/3689012/4353814/index.html
[https://perma.cc/6MXJ-3E6B]; China Declares All Crypto-Currency Transactions
Illegal, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology58678907 [https://perma.cc/D9BV-8VMK].
201
Supreme Court Ends RBI’s 2019 Ban on Banks Dealing in Cryptocurrency,
HINDUSTAN TIMES (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.hindustantimes.com/indianews/supreme-court-ends-rbi-s-ban-on-banks-dealing-in-cryptocurrency/storyQ99whSgHNG01oGOX7FyTxN.html [https://perma.cc/G47E-EX2E].
202
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., PROHIBITING THE SALE TO RETAIL CLIENTS OF
INVESTMENT PRODUCTS THAT REFERENCE CRYPTOASSETS (2020) (UK).
203 See Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N (May 7, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alertsbulletins/investoralertsia_bitcoin.html [https://perma.cc/5W7U-GLH5] (making
investors aware about the potential risks of investing in Bitcoin and other virtual
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“neighboring” regulatory regimes and disciplines. For example, one
of the first cryptocurrency-related measures adopted in the United
States was the imposition of an anti-money laundering regime. 204
Likewise, the SEC has successfully placed cryptocurrencies under its
regulatory scope by imposing sanctions on unauthorized traders
operating securities online for cryptocurrencies.205
Another application of a neighboring regime may be observed
in jurisdictions that have rigid data protection laws in place, such as
the European Union’s GDPR. In this case, the application of data
protection laws has been largely unintended. The GDPR’s data
protection principles and blockchain technology seem largely
incompatible. There are three main issues: 206 (a) the difficulty of
identifying a “controller” on a blockchain;207 (b) the extent to which
there is (active) consent by blockchain users for the processing of
their data;208 and (c) the GDPR is based on such principles as data
minimization and the right to be forgotten. 209 Most of these
principles seem to be in conflict with two of the most fundamental
currency); see alsoEBA Warns Consumers on Virtual Currencies, EUR. BANKING AUTH.
(Dec. 12, 2013), https://www.eba.europa.eu/eba-warns-consumers-on-virtualcurrencies [https://perma.cc/N28A-YSWZ] (warning consumers, among others,
on lack of regulation, other risks, and tax implications).
204
Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, Dep’t of Treasury, Guidance FIN-2013-G001,
Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to Persons Administering, Exchanging, or
Using
Virtual
Currencies
(Mar.
18,
2013)
https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013-G001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K6GT-38JP].
205 See SEC Sanctions Operator of Bitcoin-Related Stock Exchange for Registration
Violations, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014-273 [https://perma.cc/4SEA-YN9V]. According to the SEC,
investments in cryptoassets may be considered as securities for the purposes of U.S.
securities laws. See Final Judgment Entered Against Trendon T. Shavers A/K/A
“Piratreat40” – Operator of Bitcoin Ponzi Scheme Ordered to Pay More Than $40 Million
in Disgorgement and Penalties, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 22, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2014/lr23090.htm
[https://perma.cc/46EA-NYGB]. The same approach has been adopted by the SEC
with regard to ICOs. See The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 2017 WL
7184670, at *11-15 (July 25, 2017); see also Framework for “Investment Contract”
Analysis of Digital Assets, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 3, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digitalassets [https://perma.cc/4HA3-7BYK] (discussing the applicability of the Howey
test to cryptocurrencies).
206 See Dimitropoulos, supra note 33, at 171-72.
207
See GDPR, supra note 146, arts. 89, 94(1) (discussing the protection of
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC).
208 See id. art. 6.
209 See id. arts. 5(1)(b), (e).
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features of blockchain technology: information on a blockchain is
visible to every node and information cannot be removed from a
blockchain.210
Third, many countries have introduced various taxation
schemes for cryptocurrencies.211 For example, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) issued a notice clarifying that while virtual currencies
are used by consumers in the same way as legal tender, the
disposition of Bitcoin is, unlike cash, a taxable transaction to the
consumer.212
A fourth emerging intermediate approach is the elaboration of
specialized regimes for the regulation of cryptoassets and
blockchain technology more generally. The New York State
Department of Financial Services, for example, introduced the
BitLicense framework. BitLicense creates a comprehensive licensing
regime for a very wide range of intermediaries of virtual currency
service providers, including exchanges, wallets, dealers, and
administrators. 213 The rules require registration and licensing for
some of them. The Uniform Law Commission developed a model
law called the “Regulation of Virtual Currency Business Act” for the
regulation of virtual currencies, which is largely like the BitLicense
framework.214
2. Addressing Outward Digital Nationalism
Apart from private investors, governments of emerging
economies also opt to invest abroad using SOEs, SWFs, and other
similar vehicles. In Western markets, there is a concern that
sovereign investors, above all Chinese SOEs, will not invest abroad

Dimitropoulos, supra note 33, at 172.
See generally Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38, 46 (2013) (describing the mechanisms by which
“cryptocurrencies” could replace tax havens for tax-evaders).
212
I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, I.R.B. 2014-16 (Apr. 14, 2014).
213
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200 (2020).
214
UNIFORM REGUL. OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUSINESSES ACT (NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2017); see also TIMOTHY G. MASSAD, IT’S TIME TO
STRENGTHEN
THE
REGULATION
OF
CRYPTO-ASSETS,
36
(2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Timothy-MassadIts-Time-to-Strengthen-the-Regulation-of-Crypto-Assets.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Y4D-AU6F] (citing the Uniform Regulation of VirtualCurrency Businesses Act).
210
211
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based on market and commercial criteria.215 The concern has grown
since Chinese companies began investing in new technologies and
critical infrastructure.216
States have the sovereign power under international law to
regulate the entry and establishment of foreign investors in their
jurisdiction. 217 Governments are increasingly exercising this
power. 218 One may distinguish between two different types of
foreign investment control mechanisms: outright prohibition and
screening of foreign investment.219 Many jurisdictions are extending
the scope of their investment screening mechanisms (ISMs) to cover
“national security” threats arising from foreign investment in digital

215 See Haiyan Zhang & Daniel Van den Bulcke, China’s Direct Investment in the
European Union: A New Regulatory Challenge? 12 ASIA EUR. J. 159, 162 (2014).
216 See Brigitte Zypries, Michel Sapin & Carlo Calenda, Letter to Commissioner
Cecilia
Malmström
(Berlin,
Feb.
2017)
(available
online
at
https://www.bmwi.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/S-T/schreiben-de-fr-it-anmalmstroem.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5
[https://perma.cc/3AY4-7F2U])
(making the case for the need of the European Union to respond to the lack of
reciprocity of access of European companies with an edge in the technological
sector to foreign markets).
217
Government measures for the control of foreign investment aimed at
market access fall outside the scope of most IIAs unless market access is explicitly
granted to foreign parties. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, World
Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones, 92, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2019
(2019).
218 See Gisela Grieger, EU Framework for FDI Screening, at 4 (Eur. Parliamentary
Rsch.
Serv.,
PE
614.667,
2019),
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/614667/EPRS_B
RI (2018)614667_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/54J9-N2MG]. See generally S. T. Anwar,
FDI Regimes, Investment Screening Process, and Institutional Frameworks: China Versus
Others in Global Business, 46 J. WORLD TRADE 213 (2012) (highlighting the trend since
at least since 2012).
219 See Markus Burgstaller, Sovereign Wealth Funds and International Investment
Law, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND ARBITRATION 163 (Chester
Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011) (presenting a tripartite categorization).
According to UNCTAD there are three major types of ISMs: sector-specific, crosssectoral, and entity-specific. U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, supra note
217, at 93; see also Theodore H. Moran, CFIUS and National Security: Challenges for
the United States, Opportunities for the European Union 11 (Feb. 19, 2017) (draft
paper) (available at https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/cfiusand-national-security-challenges-united-states-opportunities
[https://perma.cc/3D8J-TFH2]); Karl P. Sauvant, Driving and Countervailing Forces:
A Rebalancing of National FDI Policies, in YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW & POLICY 215, 215 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2009). See generally Alvin G. Wint,
Liberalizing Foreign Direct Investment Regimes: The Vestigial Screen, 20 WORLD DEV.
1515 (1992) (assessing progress made by governments in changing processes and
structure of foreign investment screening).
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technologies. 220 The scope of review powers of the Committee of
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), for example, has
been extended recently to cover critical technologies,221 as well as the
protection of critical (physical and virtual) infrastructure.222 Similar
developments are taking place in other jurisdictions that
traditionally have been open to foreign investment, such as the
United Kingdom. 223 ISMs are an effort to avert digital nationalist
tendencies gone global.
ii. Domesticating Reassertion of Digital Sovereignty
Except for the efforts to restrain globalization, states are also
developing strategies of globalization management that involve an
effort to make use of and capitalize on—rather than repudiate—
economic globalization with the introduction, for example, of
domestic investment laws, special economic zones, international
commercial courts, and sovereign wealth funds.224
Similar developments have been taking place in the sphere of
digital globalization. Such domesticating strategies focus on
enabling, 225 rather than restraining, developments in the digital
world with a view towards promoting cross-border digital trade, as
well as attracting digital FDI to their jurisdiction. The World
Economic Forum, building on the work of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), has identified
220
U.N. Conference on Trade & Development, World Investment Report 2018:
Investment and New Industrial Policies, 83-84 (2018) (highlighting that this trend has
been taking place mostly amongst Western countries).
221
Defense Production Act § 721(a)(4), § 50 U.S.C. 4565.
222 Id. § 721(a)(6).
223
See National Security and Investment Act 2021, c. 25 (UK)
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2021/25/contents/enacted
[https://perma.cc/58E6-5EGJ] (defining seventeen defined sensitive sectors for
investment screening—almost all of them being drawn from the field of new
technologies, including Advanced Robotics; Artificial Intelligence; Computing
Hardware; Cryptographic Authentication; Data Infrastructure; Quantum
Technologies; Synthetic Biology); see also Regulation 2019/452 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 on Establishing a Framework for
the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union, PE/72/2018/REV/1,
2019 O.J. (L 791) 1-14; Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué , supra note 5, ¶ 26
(establishing an Investment Screening Expert Group and reiterating that ISMs
should respect the principles of open markets, transparency and competition).
224
Dimitropoulos, supra note 4, at 74, 92.
225 See infra section III.b.i.
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three potential strategies for governments to attract digital FDI:226
policies enabling investment in new digital activities, such as
ridesharing apps; policies enabling investment in the adoption of
digital services by traditionally non-digital firms, such as
telemedicine and mobile banking; policies enabling investment in
digital and physical infrastructure that relates to digital
technologies.
The increase in uses and value of the cryptoasset and blockchain
markets has also led to a response by national governments in an
effort to regulate blockchains. Regulation is largely influenced by
how national regulators understand blockchain and cryptoassets. I
discussed above how government intervention is often restricting. 227
Other governments, or other regulators within the same jurisdiction,
sometimes adopt more favorable approaches to blockchain. This is
mostly the case when regulators focus on the technological aspects
of blockchain rather than its transfer-of-value functions.228
Governments have adopted enabling policies in favor of
cryptoassets and other blockchain applications in the private and
financial markets, such as policies to promote FinTech startups.229
226
Matthew Stephenson, World Econ. F., Digital FDI Policies, Regulations and
Measures to Attract FDI in the Digital Economy, at 8 (Sept. 2020); Matthew Stephenson,
How to Attract ‘Digital FDI’ and Sustainable FDI for COVID-19 Recovery 2-3 (May
21,
2020)
(unpublished
paper)
(available
at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3621464
[https://perma.cc/BZ38-M7L8]); Matthew Stephenson & Nivedita Sen, How
Digital Investments Can Help the Covid-19 Recovery, WORLD ECON. F. (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/covid-19-digital-foreign-directinvestment-economic-recovery/ [https://perma.cc/Q355-BG69] (discussing the
role digital FDI can play in economic and financial recovery from the COVID19 recession). The work of the WEF builds and expands on U.N. Conference on
Trade & Development, World Investment Report 2017: Investment and the Digital
Economy (2017).
227 Supra Section II.c.i.
228
See Georgios Dimitropoulos, Global Currencies and Domestic Regulation:
Embedding through Enabling?, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND
LEGAL CHALLENGES 112, 126-27 (Philipp Hacker, Ioannis Lianos, Georgios
Dimitropoulos & Stefan Eich eds., 2019).
Different regulators take different views on the legal nature of
cryptocurrencies—sometimes treating them as money, sometimes treating them as
commodities; see, e.g., FinCEN, supra note 204 (on the former approach); In re
Coinflip, Inc., d/b/a Derivabit, and Francisco Riordan,CFTC No. 15-29, 2015 WL
5535736 (Sept. 17, 2015) (on the latter approach). The U.K. Jurisdiction Taskforce
suggested that cryptoassets can be treated as property, followed by AA v. Persons
Unknown & Ors, Re: Bitcoin [2019] EWHC (Comm) 3556, and Toma v. Murray [2020]
EWHC (Ch) 2295.
229 See Dimitropoulos, supra note 228.
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Financial regulators often adopt regulatory sandboxes for new
financial service participants. Regulating through sandboxes means
the lowering of licensing barriers for market entry, reaching
sometimes to FinTech licensing exemptions. 230 Regulatory
sandboxes are often accompanied by the launch of innovation hubs.
Their role is to help FinTech startups comply with applicable laws
and regulations, including regulatory sandboxes.231
Similar enabling responses may be identified in other areas of
digital and crypto-globalization, such as smart contracts. Arizona
has passed measures to make signatures, records, and contracts
secured through blockchain technology legally valid. 232 Another
piece of legislation forbids any county from prohibiting individuals
from “running a node on blockchain technology in a residence.”233
Washington adopted a law to support digital signature verification
with the use of distributed ledger technology.234 Similar measures
have been adopted or are in the pipelines in many more states.235
230
Regulatory sandboxes allow businesses to test new products, services,
business models, and delivery mechanisms in a more relaxed—than the ordinary—
regulatory environment. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., REGULATORY SANDBOX, 1 (Nov.
2015),
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory-sandbox.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R6XS-UKBE] (U.K.).
231
The U.K. FCA’s “FCA Innovation,” for example, operates an Innovation
Hub and a Regulatory Sandbox. See FCA Innovation – Fintech, Regtech, and Innovative
Business, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovation
[https://perma.cc/39UR-F5WQ].
232
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-7061 (2020); H.B. 2417, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2017) (“[A] contract relating to a transaction may not be denied legal effect,
validity or enforceability solely because that contract contains a smart contract
term.”).
233
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-269.22 (2020); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133122 (2020); H.B. 2216, 53d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2017).
234
S.B. 5638, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (recognizing the validity of
distributed ledger technology). Washington State has also taken a series of actions
in the direction of recognizing cryptocurrencies. See Bitcoin and Virtual Currency
Regulation,
WASH. DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS.,
https://dfi.wa.gov/bitcoin
[https://perma.cc/NK8Y-NJMX].
235 See Nick Chong, Hawaiian Banks May Soon Dabble in Crypto: Lawmakers File
Friendly Bill, BLOCKONOMI, https://blockonomi.com/hawaiian-banks-dabble-incrypto/ [https://perma.cc/8LHP-9GNL] (discussing a draft bill that has been
proposed in the State of Hawaii proposing to make it legal for banks to store digital
assets, including “virtual currencies,” “digital securities,” and “open blockchain
tokens”); JOHN MIRKOVIC, BLOCKCHAIN PILOT PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT (2017),
http://cookrecorder.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Final-Report-CCRDBlockchain-Pilot-Program-for-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3957-RPYP] (discussing
efforts in Cook County, Illinois, to move towards a blockchain-based system for the
transfer of real property); Pete Rizzo, Delaware Governor Signs Blockchain Bill into
Law, COINDESK (July 24, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/delaware-governor-
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The use of blockchain technology has already moved from the
private to the public sector. Governments are using blockchain in
increasingly varied ways, including for identity management and
attestation and retention of government records, such as land tile
registration. 236 Governments in jurisdictions such as Estonia, 237
Malta,238 and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates239 use blockchain
as part of a broader approach to deliver government services to their
citizens and beyond.
Central banks all over the world have been working on the
development of retail and wholesale central bank digital currencies
(CBDCs). 240 Venezuela has developed the “Petro,” and Sweden’s
Riksbank has long been exploring an “e-krona.” The PBOC, while it
banned the use of cryptocurrencies in China,241 has been developing
the “digital yuan” with the goal of improving its ability to track
money electronically as it changes hands, thus helping to combat
money laundering and other illegal activities.
CBDCs operate in a peer-to-peer and decentralized manner and
could be used to complement or substitute for physical money and
become an alternative to traditional bank deposits. They are not
cryptocurrencies per se; rather, they are blockchain-based fiat

signs-blockchain-legislation-law [https://perma.cc/9Y6Q-K5BH] (discussing
initiatives in Delaware to allow corporations to issue shares on the blockchain).
236
See Diego Cagigas, Judith Clifton, Daniel Diaz-Fuentes & Marcos
Fernandez-Gutierrez, Blockchain for Public Services: A Systematic Literature Review, 9
IEEE ACCESS 13904, 13916 (2021), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9326290
[https://perma.cc/BG87-LDAD]; Silvia Semenzin, David Rozas & Samer Hassan,
Blockchain-Based Application at a Governmental Level: Disruption or Illusion? The Case
of Estonia, 41 POL’Y & SOC’Y 386 (2022).
237
Estonia was among the first countries to develop a vision for an electronic
State through its E-Estonia initiative. See We Have Built a Digital Society and We Can
Show You How, E-ESTONIA, https://e-estonia.com/ [https://perma.cc/3BP8L5PG].
238
In 2018, Malta introduced three legislative instruments for the promotion
of new technologies, with an emphasis on distributed ledgers: Innovative
Technology Arrangements and Services Act (2018); Virtual Financial Assets Act
(2018); Malta Digital Innovation Authority Act (2018).
239 See Aisha Bin Bishr, Dubai: A City Powered by Blockchain, 12 INNOVATIONS:
TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 4 (2019).
240
See Ashley Lannquist, 10 Ways Central Banks are Experimenting with
Blockchain,
WORLD
ECON.
F.
(Apr.
3,
2019),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/04/blockchain-distrubuted-ledgertechnology-central-banks-10-ways-research/ [https://perma.cc/X3NF-V5RC] (on
possible central bank uses of blockchain beyond CBDC).
241 Supra Section II.c.i.1.
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currencies—a digital form of blockchain-powered fiat money with
legal tender status.242
The plans of introducing CBDCs have an explicitly international
orientation. By issuing a digital currency, the PBOC, for example,
hopes that the digital yuan would enable increased speed and lower
costs in cross-border transactions.243
Overall, states putting in place measures in favor of
domesticating sovereignty reassertion are trying to reap the benefits
of crypto- and other forms of digital globalization using their own
sovereign powers.
III. TOWARDS A NEW LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK
FOR DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION
Technology is profoundly political. 244 The above analysis
highlights the insufficiency of traditional categories, theories, and
frameworks of law and political economy to capture developments
in the digital world. The current stage of globalization is
characterized by putting the law to use to achieve different goals and
objectives. The law is not defined only by the goals and values
dictated by the once dominant ideologies of neoliberalism and
economic globalization. This Article has identified a role for
international law that in the neoliberal political economy framework
would have been played by domestic law. It has also identified a
role for domestic law that in this framework would have been
played by international law.
This Part provides a new narrative for digital globalization
based on an alternative political economy framework that sees an
242
El Salvador, in a move that fascinated the crypto-world, recently adopted
Bitcoin as legal tender. Tim Fries, El Salvador Has Adopted Bitcoin as Official Legal
Tender - but Will Other Countries Follow?, WORLD ECON. F. (Sept. 30, 2021),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/09/el-salvador-officially-adoptsbitcoin-as-legal-tender-but-will-other-countries-follow/
[https://perma.cc/KNQ5-QVPW].
243 See Binance Research (Jinze & Etienne), First Look: China’s Central Bank
Digital Currency: Overview of the expected characteristics from China’s CBDC, BINANCE
RSCH. (Aug. 28, 2019), https://research.binance.com/en/analysis/chinacbdc#fnref-12, at 2.3.1. Overall, China is actively trying to back the Chinese yuan as
the next international currency. Joel Slawotsky, U.S. Financial Hegemony: The Digital
Yuan and Risks of Dollar De-Weaponization, 44 FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 39, 49 n.6, 84-87
(2020).
244
Winner, supra note 22, at 122.
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equal role for domestic and international law in addressing the
broader digitalization of society. This framework draws on a long
line of scholarship that aims to provide an “integrated”
understanding between domestic and international law beyond the
dichotomies developed in the past decades.
The recent efforts towards the Cornwall Consensus confirm this
integrated law and political economy framework for digital
globalization. The Cornwall Consensus is a vision for a fairer
international order; one that will take digital globalization into
consideration and that will be more responsive to the ones in need
of protection. The means to achieve these goals pass through
domestic law as well as a new vision for international law.
a. An Integrated Law and Political Economy Framework
Theory of the modern state has been developed around the
epistemological condition of the state of nature. The state of nature,
according to Thomas Hobbes and his intellectual progeny, is a state
of anarchy individuals find themselves in before forming civil
society. 245 The epistemological starting point of modern
international law is anarchy, too; 246 the “domestic analogy” has
shaped international law and international relations.247 States find
themselves in the same relationship as individuals before forming
civil society—that of a constant anarchical state of war against each
other. Anarchy remains the dominant paradigm in international
relations. 248 States must ultimately rely upon their resources for

HOBBES, supra note 66, at 151-75.
G. LOWES DICKINSON, THE INTERNATIONAL ANARCHY 15 (1926); see also
KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979) (popularizing the term
in international relations scholarship).
247
Hedley Bull, Society and Anarchy in International Relations, in
INTERNATIONAL THEORY: CRITICAL INVESTIGATIONS 75, 75 (James Der Derian eds.,
Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1995).
248
Anarchy provides the foundation and starting point for all contemporary
theories of international relations—realism, liberalism, neorealism, and
neoliberalism. See generally Helen Milner, The Assumption of Anarchy in International
Relations Theory: A Critique, 17 REV. INT’L STUD. 67 (1991) (exploring anarchy in
international relations).
245
246
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survival.249 In international legal scholarship, anarchy does not have
to lead to chaos; chaos is not a final condition but a constant risk.250
The starting point of anarchy has given rise to different
traditions of international law and international relations, as well as
traditions on the relationship between domestic and international
law. International relations scholar Hedley Bull has identified three
patterns of thought in the history of the system of modern states.251
Bull’s classification is based on the perceived role of the state in
international ordering; morality and law play different roles in the
three different patterns.
A Hobbesian or realist tradition lies at the one end of the
continuum. In this tradition, international politics is seen as a
constant state of war of all against all. International politics is a zerosum game; the interests of one state exclude the interests of the
others. The law itself has little to say except maybe for certain limited
“rules of prudence or expediency.”252
The Grotian or internationalist tradition stands in the middle of
this continuum of theories of international relations. This tradition
sees international politics as taking place within a society of states:
the international society.253 While accepting the original premise of
the Hobbesian pattern that international politics is made by states, it
does not accept that states are continuously at war; instead, states
are limited in their conflicts by common rules and institutions.
Coexistence and cooperation in the society of states are predicated
upon common “imperatives of morality and law” within a
framework of common rules and institutions. 254 The idea of
organized cooperation lies between the two extremes of the
complete absence of international organized collaboration, which is
the premise of the first pattern, and the desire for world
government, which is suggested by the third pattern of thought.255

WALTZ, supra note 246, at 102 .
See Robert O. Keohane, Institutional Theory and the Realist Challenge after Cold
War, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 269, 283
(David A. Baldwin ed., 1993) (discussing uncertainty as a characteristic feature of
international affairs).
251
HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD
POLITICS 23-26 (2d ed. 1995).
252 Id. at 24.
253 Id. at 25.
254 Id. at 25-26.
255 See MAZOWER, supra note 94, at xiii.
249
250
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On the other end of the spectrum, a Kantian or cosmopolitan
tradition puts forward the idea of all-encompassing
cosmopolitanism based on federation. 256 This pattern focuses on
“trans-national social bonds that link individuals as human
beings.”257 It highlights a community of all men as a descriptive and
normative category in international relations. This community has
the potential to subsume the system of states into a community of
humankind beyond interstate relationships. It also highlights the
cooperative dimensions of international politics and the significance
of law and international morality. International law and morality
will eventually lead to the formation of a cosmopolitan society as a
community of mankind.258
This typology is now heavily contested by international relations
and international legal scholars.259 Recent work on Hobbes shows
that the English political philosopher was not a Hobbesian in the
way presented by Bull or otherwise commonly understood in
international relations theory. 260 Hobbes has been, instead,
reinterpreted as a theorist of international order— the first theorist
of a different line of thought in international political economy and
international relations and law. 261 This line of thought has been

256
Cosmopolitan legal theory, arguably founded on Kant’s philosophy, is
contrasted to “Hobbesian realism.” See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, A Political
Constitution for the Pluralist World Society?, 34 J. CHINESE PHIL. 331-42 (2007); see
ARAVIND GANESH, RIGHTFUL RELATIONS WITH DISTANT STRANGERS: KANT, THE EU,
AND THE WIDER WORLD (2021).
257
BULL, supra note 251, at 24.
258 Id. at 25.
259
See EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS,
COLONIALISM AND ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 12-39 (2002) (describing the weaknesses
of Bull’s position; according to Keene, Bull codified the mainstream dogma of the
time while making it easier for contemporary theories to use these three theories as
their starting point).
260 See Richard Tuck, The “Modern” Theory of Natural Law, in THE LANGUAGES
OF POLITICAL THEORY IN EARLY-MODERN EUROPE 99, 99-119 (Anthony Pagden ed.,
1987) (discussing the relation between Pufendorf, Hobbes, Grotius and Suárez); see
also RICHARD TUCK, PHILOSOPHY AND GOVERNMENT 1572-651 (1993) (discussing
Hobbes’ early philosophy).
261 See ISTVAN HONT, POLITICS IN COMMERCIAL SOCIETY: JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU
AND ADAM SMITH 5-8 (Béla Kapossy & Michael Sonenscher eds., 2015) (describing
Hobbes’ theory on commercial sociability); see also David Singh Grewal, The
Domestic Analogy Revisited: Hobbes on International Order, 125 YALE L.J. 620, 663-80
(2016) (transposing similar ideas onto international legal theory).
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handed over to such political theorists as Jean Jacques Rousseau and
Immanuel Kant.262
The idea of perpetual peace dominated eighteenth century
perceptions on how states would exit the state of nature and the
condition of anarchy. 263 Kant had a deterministic approach to
international politics which suggested that perpetual peace would
eventually prevail around the world.264 A world state was not such
a solution for the Prussian philosopher. 265 The first and foremost
step towards perpetual peace is state formation—the gradual
transformation of European states into constitutional republics. 266
This translates legally into developing domestic legal regimes
showcasing respect for their citizens and granting them further civil
liberties and rights.
At the same time, anarchy has a positive function for Kant.
Republican transformation could only occur if the European states
of his time were pressured by the threat and external fear of war.
International anarchy may thus provide the necessary impetus to
reform domestic politics and the law. 267 Domestic law, in this
approach, forms an important layer of international order; it is only
through domestic law that peace can be achieved. The same may be
said about the relationship between domestic law and foreign
commerce.
With the constitution of the modern state and the rise of
commercial societies, 268 commerce became, according to David
Hume, an “affair of state.” 269 Yet another area where the rivalry
among sovereigns came to expression in the Hobbesian state of

262
RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT 109-39 (Oxford Univ. Press 1999).
263 See generally, IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY
(M. Campbell Smith trans., 1795) (describing the elements required for achieving
international peace).
264 Id.
265
A world state would be a “soulless despotism,” ungovernable and
eventually leading back to square one of international relations: anarchy. Id. at 15556.
266 Id. at 120-28.
267
Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, in
KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 41, 50 (Hans Reis ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 1970).
268
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 22 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937).
269
David Hume, Of Civil Liberty (1741), in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND
LITERARY 87, 88 (Eugene Miller, rev. ed., Indianapolis, Ind: Liberty Classics 1987).
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war;270 economic war was added to political rivalry.271 “Jealousy of
trade” became the equivalent of the anarchical condition in the
international economy. 272 Some scholars thus saw the modern
system of states as largely incompatible with international trade,273
yet others saw that international commerce would eventually pacify
states in their interaction.274
Kant’s position was somewhere in the middle. Kant was
generally
favorably
predisposed
towards
international
commerce; 275 abuses of the spirit of commerce, and the severe
countermeasures that might be used to address them, would still not
prevent the expansion of commerce around the globe. 276
Commercial interests would encourage states to promote peace
since trade brings profits, which are in the mutual interest of all
states, and peace is more welcoming to trade than war. Promoting
peace requires negotiations, which means international interaction.
Instead of the jealousy of trade, the “spirit of commerce” as
expressed in economic and commercial interests would have the
result of pacifying relations among European states, as well as
See id. at 88-89.
Istvan Hont, The Political Economy of the ‘Unnatural and Retrograde’ Order:
Adam Smith and Natural Liberty, in FRANZÖSISCHE REVOLUTION UND POLITISCHE
ÖKONOMIE [FRENCH REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL ECONOMY] 122, 122-49 (Maxine
Berged., 1989); cf. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 82-83 (London: A. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1776).
272
David Hume, Of the Jealousy of Trade (1758), in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL,
AND LITERARY 327, 327–31 (Eugene Miller ed., Indianapolis, Ind: Liberty Classics
rev. ed. 1987); see also ISTVAN HONT, JEALOUSY OF TRADE: INTERNATIONAL
COMPETITION AND THE NATION-STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 390 (2006);
COMMERCE AND PEACE IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT (Béla Kapossy, Isaac Nakhimovsky,
Sophus A. Reinert & Richard Whatmore eds., 2017); MARKETS, MORALS, POLITICS:
JEALOUSY OF TRADE AND THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (Béla Kapossy, Isaac
Nakhimovsky, Sophus A. Reinert & Richard Whatmore eds., 2018) (discussing the
notion of “jealousy of trade” in different historical and political contexts).
273 See JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, THE CLOSED COMMERCIAL STATE 106-07, 117-18
(Anthony Curtis Adler trans., CUNY Press 2013). See generally, ISAAC NAKHIMOVSKI,
THE CLOSED COMMERCIAL STATE: PERPETUAL PEACE AND COMMERCIAL SOCIETY FROM
ROUSSEAU TO FICHTE 63-98 (2011) (elaborating on Fichte’s theory).
274
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL
ARGUMENTS FOR CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH 61-63 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing
eighteenth-century doux commerce theories, which held that commercial exchange
was pacifying and civilizing. Doux commerce was espoused among others by Baron
De Montesquieu, David Hume, and Adam Smith).
275
Samuel Fleischacker, Values Behind the Market: Kant’s Response to the Wealth
of Nations, 17 HIST. POL. THOUGHT 379, 379 (1996).
276
KANT, supra note 263, at 112, art. 4 (explaining the role of credit in foreign
affairs).
270

271
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between them and polities in the other continents. 277 While war
would set in motion the gradual transformation of European states
into republics, commerce would act as the means of allowing the
development of human relations into a cosmopolitan order. 278
Eventually for Kant, the connections developed by commerce made
it possible to imagine the further transformation of an international
community through law.279
The above discussion reveals a more nuanced picture of Kant
than “Kantianism” as understood in classic international relations
theory. 280 Kant’s perception of the relationship between
international and domestic law suggests that the gradual republican
transformation of states would increasingly exclude violence and
anarchy altogether. Perpetual peace and cosmopolitan unification
pass through domestic law.281
While favoring cosmopolitan ideals such as perpetual peace and
cosmopolitan purpose, Kant was not necessarily in favor of
institutionalizing these same ideas, at least at the international level.
In the economic sphere, while international commerce might be
essential to achieve economic prosperity and perpetual peace, the
means to achieve these goals would have to pass through domestic
law. The failure to make this distinction between values and
principles on the one side and institutions on the other is largely
responsible for how this line of political economy has been
misunderstood in contemporary scholarship.
This strand of international political economy boldly imagined
an international law based on international principles and values—
an international law that was not necessarily reflected in positive
international law or international institutions. This was, in fact,
according to Hedley Bull, how the law of nations was understood

See id. at 157
Id. at 139; see also NAKHIMOVSKI, supra note 273, at 66-67.
279
KANT, supra note 263, at 139, 142 (explaining the relation between “far
distant territories”).
280 See Hersch Lauterpacht, Sovereignty and Federation in International Law, in 3
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS 19, 25 (E. Lauterpacht ed., 1977) (“When in
1795 Kant formulated the articles of a federation of peoples for the mutual
guarantee of independence and the preservation of peace, he regarded it as
essential that the member States should possess a democratic constitution . . . .
However, the federation of Kant was not a federal State; it was a confederation,
presupposing the continued existence of sovereign States.”).
281
Nakhimovski, supra note 273, at 106 (discussing Fichte and currency
regulations).
277

278
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even in the Grotian tradition 282 and before the era that David
Kennedy has identified as the “era of international institutions” in
international law.283
Kant also identified another two layers of public law besides
international law: constitutional law and cosmopolitan law.284 Kant
held the view that was becoming prevalent in his time that
international law was the law regulating interactions among states.
At the same time, he placed great emphasis on cosmopolitan law as
a body of law concerned with the status of individuals as human
beings as opposed to individuals as citizens of a state, as well as the
status of individuals in their exchanges with states of which they
were not citizens. In this cosmopolitan law, “individuals and states,
standing in an external relation of mutual reaction, may be regarded
as citizens of one world-state. . . .”285 The main difference between
international law and cosmopolitan law is their addressees:286 while
international law is the law regulating the relationship between
states, cosmopolitan law regulates the relationship between
individuals and states. In Kant’s classification, “citizens of the
world” possess cosmopolitan rights independent of their
nationality.287
Kant was vague about the potential institutionalization of
cosmopolitan law.288 In this line of political economy, cosmopolitan
goals, values, and principles transcend international society
independent of the ways in which they may materialize and be
pursued organizationally and institutionally. The focus is on
universalist values without necessarily mandating the means
through which they may be institutionalized. Perpetual peace and a
cosmopolitan order can be achieved without an international law in
the contemporary sense. International institutions may be a
complementary but not a necessary condition for peaceful
coexistence of nations.
BULL, supra note 251, at 30.
David Kennedy, The Move to Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 842 (1987).
284
Cosmopolitan law appears in the third definitive article of Perpetual Peace.
KANT, supra note 263.
285 Id. at 119.
286
Pauline Kleingeld, Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for a Global
Order, 2 KANTIAN REV. 72, 74 (1998).
287
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 6:353-354 (Lara Denis ed.,
Mary Gregor trans., 2017). The “right to hospitality” is the most important
cosmopolitan right. KANT, supra note 263, at 138-39.
288
Kleingeld, supra note 286, at 81.
282
283
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Domestic law may instead contribute to the realization of
international legal principles and values. Ultimately, what matters
is the “proper” republican constitution of states. The difference
between international and cosmopolitan law also lies in the sources
of the two bodies of law. International values can also be guaranteed
via domestic law and institutions.289
This alternative vision of an integrated law and political
economy framework that is now resurfacing with digital
globalization confirms the empirical observations made above. 290
This framework confirms that one layer of law may perform more
than one function; there are no assigned functions to the different
layers of law. Domestic law may perform “international” functions,
and international law may perform “domestic” functions. The recent
efforts towards the Cornwall Consensus confirm this integrated law
and political economy framework as a paradigm for the structuring
of the international order and its digital variants.
The final section of this Article turns to a discussion of the
Cornwall Consensus and the new international (digital) order it
envisages.
b. The Cornwall Consensus: Towards a New Digital Order
Many of the assumptions that have helped give rise to our
understanding of the relationship between society and new
technologies are flawed or exaggerated. 291 For example, the main
tenet of theories of techno-globalism is the disappearance of the
state.292 In reality, neither the origin of new technologies has always
been global,293 nor the envisaged outcome been the elimination of
289 See Patrick Capps & Julian Rivers, Kant’s Concept of International Law, 16
LEGAL THEORY 229, 230 (2010) (“[P]roperly constituted states through their
collective actions could perform the administrative functions of the international
legal order.”).
290 See supra Part II.
291 But see ARNOLD PACEY, TECHNOLOGY IN WORLD CIVILIZATION: A THOUSAND–
YEAR HISTORY (1990) (discussing the impact of technology on government, military,
and other kinds of organizations). See generally DAVID EDGERTON, THE SHOCK OF THE
OLD: TECHNOLOGY AND GLOBAL HISTORY SINCE 1900 (suggesting that most of the
standard assumptions about technology upon which studies of technology and
global history are founded are flawed).
292
Edgerton, supra note 37, at 10-11.
293
See generally MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE:
DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR (2013) (discussing the pivotal role of the state
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the state.294 Moreover, while techno-globalism has propagated the
liberation of society from the political constraints of the state, new
technologies have often resulted in centralization and hierarchical
control rather than liberation of individuals and society.295 The same
indeterminacies shape the assumptions at the other end of the
continuum. The notion of “national technology” is largely
inaccurate, especially in times of crisis. For example, in autocratic
and nationalistic periods, it is the national technologies of autocracy
that are quick to internationalize.296
The emerging Cornwall Consensus under the auspices of the G7
brings digital technologies and digital globalization to the center
stage of the contemporary international order. Cornwall envisages
a new social contract for digital technologies. 297 It imagines a
relationship between the law and the digital world that will be
largely different from the relationship between law and economic
globalization as was developed during the twentieth century.
Cornwall does not envisage a universalist digital globalization. It
aims instead at reclaiming digital naturalism through a process of
devolution. International law is also to take a new shape in the
digital sphere and beyond: that of plurilateralism.
i. Digital Devolution
To address the challenges posed by economic globalization and
neoliberalism, states have turned to more political international fora
such as the G7 and the Group of 20 (G20), and beyond.298 The G7 has
in furthering innovation and entrepreneurship); MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE VALUE
OF EVERYTHING: MAKING AND TAKING IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2018) (claiming that
the world’s major economic advances—including railways, automobiles,
pharmaceutical, as well as contemporary technological innovations—are the result
of state-driven innovation).
294 See Edgerton, supra note 37, at 13 (detailing the military origins of radio,
and its connection to national power); id. at 14 (discussing the impact of the state
system on the innovation of various weapons, aviation, and telecommunications).
295
Winner, supra note 22, at 132; see also Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Erica Frantz
& Joseph Wright, The Digital Dictators: How Technology Strengthens Autocracy, 99
FOREIGN AFFS. 103, 104 (2020) (discussing “digital autocracies”).
296
Edgerton, supra note 37, at 18.
297 See supra text accompanying notes 9 and 11.
298
The United States and the European Union announced in September 2021,
for example, the establishment of a new EU-US Trade and Technology Council. See
European Commission Press Release Statement/21/4951, EU-US Trade and
Technology Council Inaugural Joint Statement (Sept. 29, 2021).
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formed a Panel on Economic Resilience that recently came up with
some key policy recommendations to strengthen collective
economic resilience. 299 Building on the work of the Panel, the G7
leaders issued in June 2021 the Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué
titled “Our Shared Agenda for Global Action to Build Back Better.”
The result of this process was the Cornwall Consensus, taking
its name after the location where the G7 meeting took place. The
Cornwall Consensus mimics in its title the Washington Consensus,
the constitution of the neoliberal world order.300 G7 leaders hoped
that Cornwall will replace the Washington Consensus as the
constitution of a post-financial crisis and post-pandemic world.
Cornwall’s goal is to achieve “a new consensus and restore public
trust in a rules-based, free, fair and open economic system.”301 The
Consensus builds on traditional notions of international ordering
favoring a “rules-based world order.” Free trade should remain one
of the main pillars of this order. 302 Multilateralism—both
multilateral agreements as well as multilateral dispute settlement,
such as before the WTO—remain important in the new world
envisaged by Cornwall.
Economic globalization demanded that trade and investment be
regulated at the international level by institutions created by
multilateral and other international agreements. As discussed
above,303 domestic law during the years of economic globalization
was largely seen as unimportant or sometimes inhibitive of the
international order, and international law.
The Cornwall Consensus offers a different vision of international
ordering in the post-Washington Consensus world. Domestic and
international rules are given equal weight in a future vision of better
global governance aimed at economic resilience. 304 International
ordering envisaged by Cornwall passes through domestic law. The

299 See generally G7 PANEL ON ECON. RESILIENCE, KEY POL’Y RECOMMENDATIONS,
supra note 5 (outlining interventions the G7 is taking to meet collective challenges).
300
Williamson, supra note 11. The Bretton Woods institutions and IIAs such
as BITs reinforced the Washington Consensus and requested from the South and
East to engage in free trade and investment. See, e.g., Chantal Thomas & Joel P.
Trachtman, Editors’ Introduction, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL
SYSTEM 1, 9-10 (Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009); SONIA E. ROLLAND,
DEVELOPMENT AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 51-52 (2012).
301
CORNWALL CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 1.
302 See Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, supra note 5, ¶¶ 27-36.
303 Supra Section I.b.
304
CORNWALL CONSENSUS, supra note 5, at 2.
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starting point of the consensus is domestic law.305 Cornwall aims to
“build back the State.”306
The new consensus also recognizes the important place of digital
technologies and digital globalization. It acknowledges both their
societally significant potential as well as their risks for contemporary
societies. 307 Cyberspace, for example, is recognized as a future
frontier.308 The digital sphere is elevated to the status of one of the
four themes central to economic resilience—alongside health, trade
and climate.309
Cornwall imagines thus a devolved digital order. The digital
devolution propelled by Cornwall must be seen in the light of the
above discussed integrated political economy. While some domestic
measures may be suggesting a move away from international law as
developed during the years of economic globalization, almost all of
them take place in an environment of broader acceptance of
international principles and values. Domesticating reassertion of
digital sovereignty is an effort by some governments to make use of
domestic law and policies to achieve results that in a globalized
world would have been pursued through the means of international
law.310 Domestic policies and measures adopted under the mode of
domesticating reassertion of sovereignty are especially indicative of
a furtherance of international or cosmopolitan principles and values
rather than a repudiation thereof.311
Overall, while using domestic law, Cornwall reaffirms the
commitment of countries to the main principles and values of
international law in the digital sphere.
305 Id. at 1 (“[E]conomic resilience starts at home and primarily owes itself to
sound, inclusive and sustainable domestic policies . . . .”).
306 See generally Mazzucato, supra note 8 (detailing the need for strengthening
public sector capabilities to tackle challenges).
307
Cyber-space is for example recognized as a future frontier. Carbis Bay G7
Summit Communiqué, supra note 5, ¶ 31.
308 Id. ¶ 31.
309
G7 PANEL ON ECON. RESILIENCE, KEY POL’Y RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 5,
at 1.
310
Scholars have highlighted the more “enabling” nature of the law in its
interaction with technology. Sheila Jasanoff, for example, has explained that “[t]he
law today not only interprets the social impacts of science and technology but also
constructs the very environment in which science and technology come to have
meaning, utility, and force.” SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 16 (1997); see also Georgios Dimitropoulos, supra note
228, at 115.
311
One could remark this represents a “Kantian moment” in domestic law.
See supra Section III.a.
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ii. Digital Plurilateralism
Cornwall does not put forward efficiency as the constitutive
principle of the digital order. It asserts instead that bridging the
digital divide and “promoting digital literacy worldwide” should be
understood as one of the greatest challenges in the future for
humanity. 312 The consensus also invites states to regulate digital
globalization considering the interests of the states, as well as “all
parts of . . . countries,” and “all peoples across the globe, especially
the poor.”313
While affirming free trade, the G7 leaders make a commitment
to a fairer international order, one that will be based on the principle
of equality of opportunities for all individuals and support for the
poor. 314 The same is true for investment. While economic and
financial recovery in the post-COVID world must be “investmentled,” investment should be made in such a way as to become “more
inclusive.”315
Even before the current influx of domestic measures for the
regulation of digital globalization, most states had taken up the
challenge of addressing the issues arising out of digital globalization
and the rise of the digital economy with new RTAs and other forms
of PTAs.316 Cornwall does not necessarily deny the central role of
PTAs in the post-neoliberal world order.317 Its hope though is that
international multi-state coordination and cooperation will take
place within multilateral institutions such as the WTO.

312
Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, supra note 5, ¶ 32; see also U.N.
Conference on Trade & Development, supra note 226, at 189-210; Aaronson &
Leblond, supra note 126, at 269 (focusing on digital divides across states, in the US,
the EU, and China, on the one side, and the rest of the international community, on
the other).
313
Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, supra note 5, ¶ 27.
314 See id. ¶ 27.
315 See G7 PANEL ON ECON. RESILIENCE, KEY POL’Y RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 5, at 7.
316 See supra Section I.b.ii.
317
During the era of economic globalization, regionalism has been seen by
some as a threat to the integrity of multilateralism and the multilateral trading
system (the “spaghetti bowl effect”), while for others regionalism is yet another step
toward multilateralism (the “domino effect”). Compare JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES
IN THE TRADING SYSTEM 61-71 (2008), with Richard Baldwin, A Domino Theory of
Regionalism, in EXPANDING MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 25, 33-36 (Richard
Baldwin, Pertti Haaparanta & Jaakko Kiander eds., 1995).
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Cornwall thus generally affirms multilateralism. It still
envisages a break with the WTO’s single-undertaking approach.318
The consensus aspires instead to a more flexible WTO and overall
multilateral legal order that will allow a broader use of
plurilateralism.319 Plurilaterals have a long, yet sometimes forgotten,
history in the international trade regime.320 The Multi-Party Interim
Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) is only the most
prominent instantiation of a rich history of plurilaterals. 321 Their
value-proposition as more generalized instruments of international
law is now being explored in academia, 322 as well as

318
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, at art.
II.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
319
Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, supra note 5, ¶ 28.
320
Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Origins of Plurilateralism in International Trade
Law, 20 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 633, 635 (2021).
321 See generally Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA),
GENEVA TRADE PLATFORM, https://wtoplurilaterals.info/plural_initiative/thempia/ [https://perma.cc/3Z65-UBN5] (discussing the creation and current status
of MPIA).
322 See generally Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros Mavroidis, WTO ‘à la carte’ or
‘menu du jour’? Assessing the Case for More Plurilateral Agreements, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L.
319, 324 (2015) (discussing potential uses for plurilateral agreements); Meredith
Kolsky Lewis, Mega-FTAs & Plurilateral Trade Agreements: Implications for the AsiaPacific, in PARADIGM SHIFT IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW RULE-MAKING 419, 419
(Julien Chaisse, Henry Gao & Chang-fa Lo eds., 2017) (discussing different
approaches to plurilateral agreements); Bernard M. Hoekman & Charles Sabel,
Open Plurilateral Agreements, International Regulatory Cooperation and the WTO, 10
GLOB. POL’Y 297, 297 (2019) (discussing open plurilateral agreements); Bernard M.
Hoekman, Urgent and Important: Improving WTO Performance by Revisiting Working
Practices, 53 J. WORLD TRADE 373, 373-76 (2019) (discussing the potential role of
plurilaterals in WTO reform); Bernard Hoekman & Charles F. Sabel, In a World of
Value Chains: What Space for Regulatory Coherence and Cooperation in Trade Agreements,
in MEGAREGULATION CONTESTED, supra note 159, at 217 (discussing countries’ greater
focus on plurilateral agreements).
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policymaking. 323 Cornwall’s vision is that PTAs will eventually
transform into plurilaterals.324
The consensus also gives guidance on the areas to be developed
under the revamped and more plurilateral WTO framework. Digital
technologies and e-commerce have the center stage again.325 Some
of the most prominent plurilaterals have historically been developed
and adopted in new technologies, notably the Information
Technology Agreement (ITA) and the Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications (ABT). The WTO established a work program
on e-commerce in 1998. This has delivered limited results so far;
above all, it has maintained a moratorium on customs duties on
electronic transmissions. 326 The stalemate was to some extent
overcome during the 11th WTO Ministerial Conference in Buenos
Aires in December 2017 with the Joint Initiative on E-Commerce,
alongside other initiatives. The e-commerce negotiations were taken
up again in the beginning of 2019, and more than eighty members,
including the United States and the European Union, are currently
negotiating on a plurilateral basis an agreement on e-commerce
within the WTO.327
323 See CORNWALL CONSENSUS, supra note 5; see also Axel Berger, Clara Brandi,
Manfred Elsig, Anwarul Hoda & Xinquan Tu, Improving Key Functions of the World
Trade Organization: Fostering Open Plurilaterals, Regime Management, & DecisionMaking,
T20
POLICY
BRIEF
(Nov.
20,
2020),
https://www.g20insights.org/policy_briefs/improving-key-functions-of-the-world-tradeorganization-fostering-open-plurilaterals-regime-management-and-decisionmaking/ [https://perma.cc/T4P3-CE7B] (differentiating between “closed” and
“open plurilaterals”); Peter Draper & Memory Dube, Plurilaterals and the Multilateral
Trading
System,
E15
INITIATIVE
(Nov.
20,
2020),
https://e15initiative.org/publications/plurilaterals-and-the-multilateral-tradingsystem [https://perma.cc/96WN-DBZL].
324 See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Plurilateral Trade Negotiations: Supplanting or
Supplementing the Multilateral Trading System?, ASIL INSIGHTS (July 12, 2013),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/17/plurilateral-tradenegotiations-supplanting-or-supplementing
[https://perma.cc/Q95L-LU3Q]
(discussing the advantages and disadvantages of plurilateralism from the point of
view of whether it promotes or obstructs multilateralism).
325 See Carbis Bay G7 Summit Communiqué, supra note 5, ¶ 32.
326
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 May 1998, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2, 37 ILM 1248 (1998) (regarding the initial agreement on
the moratorium); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 17 Dec.
2011, WTO Doc. WT/L/843 (regarding its extension).
327
World Trade Organization, Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce,
Committee of 25 Jan. 2019 WTO Doc. WT/L/1056 (Jan. 25, 2019); Joint Initiative on
E-commerce,
E-COMMERCE
(Nov.
20,
2020),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/joint_statement_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/39NV-T656] (including information and historical background
on the e-commerce initiative); Ines Willemyns, Agreement Forthcoming? A
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In the framework of an integrated political economy, plurilateral
agreements have the potential to structure multi-party international
collaboration that would take into account the interests of the
individual states while at the same time remaining open for other
countries to join after they have been established by a core group.328
“Digital plurilateralism” is a compromise between a past based on
multilateralism and the fear of a future of fragmented digital
jurisdictions—a future of an integrated global digital order, where
domestic and international law will have an equal share in the
regulation of the digital world.329
CONCLUSION
This Article provides an alternative narrative for regulating
digital globalization based on an integrated law and political
economy framework. This framework sees an equal role for
domestic and international law in dealing with universal
phenomena such as digital globalization and the broader
digitalization of society. The move to domestic law does not
necessarily signify a trend for most states to isolate themselves from
other states and the international economy. It is rather often an effort
to achieve international goals while exercising more control over the
types and means of digital globalization. This process is rather more
broadly akin to a different version of an international political
Comparison of EU, US, and Chinese RTAs in Times of Plurilateral E-Commerce
Negotiations, 23 J. INT’L ECON. L. 221, 221-30 (2020) (comparing domestic, regional
and plurilateral approaches to the regulation of e-commerce); Asif Khan,
Muhammad Abid Hussain Shah Jillani, Ahmed Arafa Abdelrehim Hammad &
Nishan Soomro, Plurilateral Negotiation of WTO E-commerce in the Context of Digital
Economy: Recent Issues and Developments, 26 J.L. & POL. SCI. 28, 28-31 (2021) (focusing
on data localization, source code and algorithm regulation in e-commerce
negotiations); see also Burri, supra note 115 (discussing ways in which this sort of
plurilateralism can be achieved).
328 See Hoekman, supra note 322, at 386, 389.
329
Georgios Dimitropoulos, Digital Plurilateralism: Towards Unilateral
Multilateralism in International Economic Law?, (Nov. 2022) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for
Prosperity (IPEF) launched in spring 2022 confirms these developments. Its first—
out of four—pillar is dedicated to future collaboration in digital trade. See Press
Release, White House: Briefing Room, Statement on Indo-Pacific Economic
Framework for Prosperity (May 23, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2022/05/23/statement-on-indo-pacific-economicframework-for-prosperity/ [https://perma.cc/2VLD-CXND].
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economy compared to the one dominant during neoliberalism and
economic globalization. The emerging Cornwall Consensus
embodies these transformations in an integrated political economy
for digital globalization.
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